fixes: #4836
---
main/krb5/APKBUILD | 18 +-
main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch | 101 ++++++
main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch | 564 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch | 731 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch | 50 +++
5 files changed, 1463 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
diff --git a/main/krb5/APKBUILD b/main/krb5/APKBUILD
index d3ddfc9..fef6004 100644
--- a/main/krb5/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/krb5/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=krb5
pkgver=1.13.1
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
case $pkgver in
*.*.*) _ver=${pkgver%.*};;
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-server
$pkgname-server-ldap:ldap $pkgname-pkinit $pkgname-libs"
source="http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/${_ver}/krb5-$pkgver-signed.tar
mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
+ CVE-2015-2694.patch
+ CVE-2015-2695.patch
+ CVE-2015-2696.patch
+ CVE-2015-2697.patch
krb5kadmind.initd
krb5kdc.initd
@@ -120,16 +124,28 @@ libs() {
md5sums="567586cdf02aa8c842c2fab7a94f3c1f krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
c84a0c7d8014e3528524956ffdd1c3e9 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
+98d4792ff9576efab658be312ef7623f CVE-2015-2694.patch
+ca73fdd31a2d5c38993afbed909b5417 CVE-2015-2695.patch
+dc4c2a99b5b8a9bf7b306d614134c267 CVE-2015-2696.patch
+a2369d91ccef67f093af594d941ebc11 CVE-2015-2697.patch
9c0e3bac122326cdbbbac068056ee8af krb5kadmind.initd
71131479c07a2d89b30a2ea18dd64e74 krb5kdc.initd
d94873a6a1ac6277adf2d25458eda9e5 krb5kpropd.initd"
sha256sums="4df629fdf97f362cf81edbf38d613b32b492dd88c876cf3aa1c66562f296663e krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
84007c7423f67db7a8b248b9643c49ef25f2d56ce15c2574eb41ecbf51bcd3f2 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
+f3710f2f90542145a8921dc7c2b8241d8fdeccdcba3d50b1758aa0e2f8aeec73 CVE-2015-2694.patch
+b83dd0714f1ab164f6eb50d173bec25bb851c739ed5b1c38b35e7a1910cff25b CVE-2015-2695.patch
+add426d86d31c57dc8e1c1d9043f61c21f2e532e728d1d9c703b2616bf246d7c CVE-2015-2696.patch
+e1d3d6a0dfede9d5a4af83d51c4f5fad13e917e4cb58672ff0ee3e8f34fe0379 CVE-2015-2697.patch
213a5b04f091e4644e856aabc38da586bd86c4616ab15f00eefca52fca7137d6 krb5kadmind.initd
577842c7fe4639a8e9dd349da40e514284dd53440bb71be58283faaf18508f9a krb5kdc.initd
1644639d83791bd871f3c89a53a7052ab52994d3ef03d1d675d4217130c1fa94 krb5kpropd.initd"
sha512sums="f26dce8f682bd3fbf38a15df5f91722b573d4df4cc193f7ba8dc369cbbee8f4bc2a72f56513d2cf27697ce8baaf954afe04e3eefc15c2883fa1d5260145aef6e krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
5a3782ff17b383f8cd0415fd13538ab56afd788130d6ad640e9f2682b7deaae7f25713ce358058ed771091040dccf62a3bc87e6fd473d505ec189a95debcc801 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
+0c8ab8a1d6bfa31b3257c1ac4f99d9c14d4f8ed0c27da0e648f64e9e5e5717ca5d929def6fd1f04903b287786add4a93e8f1c1f96cea14d123c1574c174a532a CVE-2015-2694.patch
+4e1499d799bed90b2857d24de29ea3bb7500b514a86c2a8f4596fb80f97f01445b7dd9d0cb19c1cfb1f03f5c6a8e2a2149a6278c720933181db8e188063dcc6a CVE-2015-2695.patch
+d27e836a3e8a1ca6b711c0ce4f9f68cbd42d888cb9dcaf2dcb78fdc9ca7652865c124e14c7026b4e94a722a314a0c30f732cc00344973ee5a180f11901347ed1 CVE-2015-2696.patch
+5f6a630b566c9f0cb02528fca3a789547e294acf5f3435eb62b79411187e4fcaaa58b81eff34e8ac6cbca3dacb076bd626a31687c04936b35bf7ab3e35965a31 CVE-2015-2697.patch
43b9885b7eb8d0d60920def688de482f2b1701288f9acb1bb21dc76b2395428ff304961959eb04ba5eafd0412bae35668d6d2c8223424b9337bc051eadf51682 krb5kadmind.initd
ede15f15bbbc9d0227235067abe15245bb9713aea260d397379c63275ce74aea0db6c91c15d599e40c6e89612d76f3a0f8fdd21cbafa3f30d426d4310d3e2cec krb5kdc.initd
45be0d421efd41e9dd056125a750c90856586e990317456b68170d733b03cba9ecd18ab87603b20e49575e7839fb4a6d628255533f2631f9e8ddb7f3cc493a90 krb5kpropd.initd"
diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6154965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From df8afc60d970a7176a55ffe7ce21cfd57ba423cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 12:02:37 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
+
+In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
+the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
+module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
+realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
+erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
+
+CVE-2015-2694:
+
+In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
+support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
+requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
+encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
+used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
+password.
+
+ CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
+
+(cherry picked from commit e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604)
+
+ticket: 8160
+version_fixed: 1.13.2
+status: resolved
+---
+ src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c | 10 +++++++---
+ src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
+index bf9c6a8..7941b4a 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static krb5_preauthtype otp_pa_type_list[] =
+ struct request_state {
+ krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond;
+ void *arg;
++ krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply;
+ };
+
+ static krb5_error_code
+@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ on_response(void *data, krb5_error_code retval, otp_response response)
+ if (retval == 0 && response != otp_response_success)
+ retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+
++ if (retval == 0)
++ rs.enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
++
+ rs.respond(rs.arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+@@ -263,8 +267,6 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
+ krb5_data d, plaintext;
+ char *config;
+
+- enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
+-
+ /* Get the FAST armor key. */
+ armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
+ if (armor_key == NULL) {
+@@ -298,12 +300,14 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+- /* Create the request state. */
++ /* Create the request state. Save the response callback, and the
++ * enc_tkt_reply pointer so we can set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH flag later. */
+ rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval);
+ if (rs == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ rs->arg = arg;
+ rs->respond = respond;
++ rs->enc_tkt_reply = enc_tkt_reply;
+
+ /* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */
+ retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
+diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+index 5639fca..edfce6f 100644
+--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
+@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+
+ pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
+ if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
+- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
+
+ plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
+ if (plgctx == NULL) {
+- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+
diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08bc8ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+From b51b33f2bc5d1497ddf5bd107f791c101695000d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:27:52 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
+
+The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
+mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
+most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
+assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
+programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
+establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
+opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
+gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
+
+CVE-2015-2695:
+
+In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
+gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
+cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
+generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
+the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
+after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
+applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
+bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
+gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
+results, but applications should not make access control decisions
+based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
+
+ CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
+behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
+
+ticket: 8244
+target_version: 1.14
+tags: pullup
+---
+ src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h | 2 +
+ src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
+index 57372de..5c82764 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
+@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ int firstpass;
+ int mech_complete;
+ int nego_done;
++ int initiate;
++ int opened;
+ OM_uint32 ctx_flags;
+ gss_name_t internal_name;
+ gss_OID actual_mech;
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
+index ef76e1f..7849c85 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
+@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static OM_uint32 get_negotiable_mechs(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_cred_usage_t, gss_OID_set *);
+ static void release_spnego_ctx(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *);
+ static void check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t);
+-static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(void);
++static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(int);
+ static int put_mech_set(gss_OID_set mechSet, gss_buffer_t buf);
+ static int put_input_token(unsigned char **, gss_buffer_t, unsigned int);
+ static int put_mech_oid(unsigned char **, gss_OID_const, unsigned int);
+@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx)
+ }
+
+ static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t
+-create_spnego_ctx(void)
++create_spnego_ctx(int initiate)
+ {
+ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
+ spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)
+@@ -477,6 +477,8 @@ create_spnego_ctx(void)
+ spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0;
+ spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0;
+ spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0;
++ spnego_ctx->opened = 0;
++ spnego_ctx->initiate = initiate;
+ spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+
+@@ -642,7 +644,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
+
+- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(1);
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+@@ -659,10 +661,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+- /*
+- * The actual context is not yet determined, set the output
+- * context handle to refer to the spnego context itself.
+- */
++
+ sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ *ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
+ sc = NULL;
+@@ -1108,16 +1107,11 @@ spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
+ }
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
+ if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+- /*
+- * Now, switch the output context to refer to the
+- * negotiated mechanism's context.
+- */
+- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
++ spnego_ctx->opened = 1;
+ if (actual_mech != NULL)
+ *actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
+ if (ret_flags != NULL)
+ *ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
+- release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
+ } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
+@@ -1285,7 +1279,7 @@ acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
+ if (sc == NULL) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+@@ -1367,7 +1361,7 @@ acc_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &sc->DER_mechTypes);
+ assert(mech_wanted != GSS_C_NO_OID);
+ } else
+- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
+ if (sc == NULL) {
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
+@@ -1750,13 +1744,12 @@ spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
+ ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc->ctx_handle;
++ sc->opened = 1;
+ if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
+ src_name != NULL) {
+ *src_name = sc->internal_name;
+ sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ }
+- release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
+ } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ if (sc != NULL) {
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
+@@ -2069,8 +2062,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap(
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ input_message_buffer,
+ output_message_buffer,
+ conf_state,
+@@ -2090,8 +2088,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap(
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_req_flag,
+ qop_req,
+ input_message_buffer,
+@@ -2108,8 +2111,14 @@ spnego_gss_process_context_token(
+ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ /* SPNEGO doesn't have its own context tokens. */
++ if (!sc->opened)
++ return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
++
+ ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ token_buffer);
+
+ return (ret);
+@@ -2133,19 +2142,9 @@ spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
+ if (*ctx == NULL)
+ return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
+
+- /*
+- * If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
+- */
+- if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
+- (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
+- &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
+- output_token);
+- (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
+- } else {
+- ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
+- output_token);
+- }
++ (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
++ output_token);
++ (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+@@ -2157,8 +2156,13 @@ spnego_gss_context_time(
+ OM_uint32 *time_rec)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_context_time(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ time_rec);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+@@ -2170,9 +2174,20 @@ spnego_gss_export_sec_context(
+ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = *(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
++
++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established
++ * contexts. */
++ if (!sc->opened)
++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
++
+ ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ &sc->ctx_handle,
+ interprocess_token);
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
++ release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
++ }
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+@@ -2182,11 +2197,12 @@ spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
+ const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
+ {
+- OM_uint32 ret;
+- ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status,
+- interprocess_token,
+- context_handle);
+- return (ret);
++ /*
++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO
++ * exported context tokens, only tokens for underlying mechs. So just
++ * return an error for now.
++ */
++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
+
+@@ -2203,16 +2219,48 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_context(
+ int *opened)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (src_name != NULL)
++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ if (targ_name != NULL)
++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
++ *lifetime_rec = 0;
++ if (mech_type != NULL)
++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
++ *ctx_flags = 0;
++ if (locally_initiated != NULL)
++ *locally_initiated = sc->initiate;
++ if (opened != NULL)
++ *opened = sc->opened;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
++ ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle,
++ src_name, targ_name, lifetime_rec,
++ mech_type, ctx_flags, NULL, NULL);
++ }
+
+- ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
+- src_name,
+- targ_name,
+- lifetime_rec,
+- mech_type,
+- ctx_flags,
+- locally_initiated,
+- opened);
++ if (!sc->opened) {
++ /*
++ * We are still doing SPNEGO negotiation, so report SPNEGO as
++ * the OID. After negotiation is complete we will report the
++ * underlying mechanism OID.
++ */
++ if (mech_type != NULL)
++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
++
++ /*
++ * Remove flags we don't support with partially-established
++ * contexts. (Change this to keep GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG if we add
++ * support for exporting partial SPNEGO contexts.)
++ */
++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) {
++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG;
++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
++ }
++ }
+
+ return (ret);
+ }
+@@ -2227,8 +2275,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
+ OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_req_flag,
+ qop_req,
+ req_output_size,
+@@ -2245,8 +2298,13 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic(
+ gss_buffer_t message_token)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ qop_req,
+ message_buffer,
+ message_token);
+@@ -2262,8 +2320,13 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic(
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ msg_buffer,
+ token_buffer,
+ qop_state);
+@@ -2278,8 +2341,14 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
+ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function. */
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
++
+ ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ desired_object,
+ data_set);
+ return (ret);
+@@ -2359,8 +2428,15 @@ spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
+ const gss_buffer_t value)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
++
++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function, and we cannot
++ * construct an empty SPNEGO context with it. */
++ if (sc == NULL || sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
++
+ ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ &sc->ctx_handle,
+ desired_object,
+ value);
+ return (ret);
+@@ -2377,8 +2453,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_req_flag,
+ qop_req,
+ input_assoc_buffer,
+@@ -2399,8 +2480,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ input_message_buffer,
+ input_assoc_buffer,
+ output_payload_buffer,
+@@ -2419,8 +2505,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ int iov_count)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_req_flag,
+ qop_req,
+ conf_state,
+@@ -2438,8 +2529,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ int iov_count)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_state,
+ qop_state,
+ iov,
+@@ -2457,8 +2553,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ int iov_count)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ conf_req_flag,
+ qop_req,
+ conf_state,
+@@ -2475,8 +2576,13 @@ spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
+ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
++
+ ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ input_message_buffer);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+@@ -2721,8 +2827,13 @@ spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_buffer_t prf_out)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 ret;
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
+ ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
+- context,
++ sc->ctx_handle,
+ prf_key,
+ prf_in,
+ desired_output_len,
+@@ -2863,7 +2974,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
+ int iov_count)
+ {
+- return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
++ return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
+ iov_count);
+ }
+
+@@ -2872,7 +2988,12 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
+ int iov_count)
+ {
+- return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_state, iov,
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
++ return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_state, iov,
+ iov_count);
+ }
+
+@@ -2881,7 +3002,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
+ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
+ {
+- return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
++
++ return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
+ iov_count);
+ }
+
diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1f50a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
+From e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:28:36 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
+
+The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
+krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
+most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
+assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
+programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
+establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
+type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
+structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
+establishment.
+
+CVE-2015-2696:
+
+In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
+gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
+cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
+generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
+native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
+IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
+with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
+access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
+to context establishment.
+
+ CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
+
+[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
+behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
+
+ticket: 8244
+target_version: 1.14
+tags: pullup
+---
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h | 114 ++++++++++++
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c | 105 +++++++++--
+ src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c | 351 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 3 files changed, 529 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
+index 9aae12a..97e090d 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
+@@ -621,6 +621,21 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext
+ );
+ #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
+
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid
++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
++ const gss_ctx_id_t,
++ /* context_handle */
++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */
++ gss_buffer_set_t* /* data_set */
++);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option
++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
++ gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */
++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */
++ const gss_buffer_t/* value */
++);
++
+ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_process_context_token
+ (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
+ gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */
+@@ -1302,6 +1317,105 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
+ krb5_gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_buffer_t token,
+ gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle);
+
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ OM_uint32 *time_rec);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t *src_name,
++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
++ int *locally_initiated, int *opened);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
++ gss_buffer_t message_token);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
++ int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
++ int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size,
++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size);
++
++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token);
++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ const gss_OID desired_object,
++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
++ const gss_OID desired_object,
++ const gss_buffer_t value);
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t prf_out);
++
+ /* Magic string to identify exported krb5 GSS credentials. Increment this if
+ * the format changes. */
+ #define CRED_EXPORT_MAGIC "K5C1"
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
+index 0be92e4..c4dfdd6 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
+@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct {
+ }
+ };
+
+-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
+ krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
+ const gss_OID desired_object,
+@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static struct {
+ };
+ #endif
+
+-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
+ krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
+ const gss_OID desired_object,
+@@ -929,20 +929,103 @@ static struct gss_config krb5_mechanism = {
+ krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length,
+ };
+
++/* Functions which use security contexts or acquire creds are IAKERB-specific;
++ * other functions can borrow from the krb5 mech. */
++static struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = {
++ { GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID_LENGTH, GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID },
++ NULL,
++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred,
++ krb5_gss_release_cred,
++ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context,
++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT
++ NULL,
++#else
++ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context,
++#endif
++ iakerb_gss_process_context_token,
++ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context,
++ iakerb_gss_context_time,
++ iakerb_gss_get_mic,
++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic,
++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_WRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE)
++ NULL,
++#else
++ iakerb_gss_wrap,
++#endif
++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_UNWRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE)
++ NULL,
++#else
++ iakerb_gss_unwrap,
++#endif
++ krb5_gss_display_status,
++ krb5_gss_indicate_mechs,
++ krb5_gss_compare_name,
++ krb5_gss_display_name,
++ krb5_gss_import_name,
++ krb5_gss_release_name,
++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred,
++ NULL, /* add_cred */
++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT
++ NULL,
++ NULL,
++#else
++ iakerb_gss_export_sec_context,
++ NULL,
++#endif
++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_mech,
++ krb5_gss_inquire_names_for_mech,
++ iakerb_gss_inquire_context,
++ krb5_gss_internal_release_oid,
++ iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit,
++ krb5_gss_localname,
++ krb5_gss_authorize_localname,
++ krb5_gss_export_name,
++ krb5_gss_duplicate_name,
++ krb5_gss_store_cred,
++ iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid,
++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_oid,
++ iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option,
++ krb5_gssspi_set_cred_option,
++ krb5_gssspi_mech_invoke,
++ NULL, /* wrap_aead */
++ NULL, /* unwrap_aead */
++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov,
++ iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov,
++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length,
++ NULL, /* complete_auth_token */
++ NULL, /* acquire_cred_impersonate_name */
++ NULL, /* add_cred_impersonate_name */
++ NULL, /* display_name_ext */
++ krb5_gss_inquire_name,
++ krb5_gss_get_name_attribute,
++ krb5_gss_set_name_attribute,
++ krb5_gss_delete_name_attribute,
++ krb5_gss_export_name_composite,
++ krb5_gss_map_name_to_any,
++ krb5_gss_release_any_name_mapping,
++ iakerb_gss_pseudo_random,
++ NULL, /* set_neg_mechs */
++ krb5_gss_inquire_saslname_for_mech,
++ krb5_gss_inquire_mech_for_saslname,
++ krb5_gss_inquire_attrs_for_mech,
++ krb5_gss_acquire_cred_from,
++ krb5_gss_store_cred_into,
++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password,
++ krb5_gss_export_cred,
++ krb5_gss_import_cred,
++ NULL, /* import_sec_context_by_mech */
++ NULL, /* import_name_by_mech */
++ NULL, /* import_cred_by_mech */
++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov,
++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov,
++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length,
++};
++
+ #ifdef _GSS_STATIC_LINK
+ #include "mglueP.h"
+ static int gss_iakerbmechglue_init(void)
+ {
+ struct gss_mech_config mech_iakerb;
+- struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = krb5_mechanism;
+-
+- /* IAKERB mechanism mirrors krb5, but with different context SPIs */
+- iakerb_mechanism.gss_accept_sec_context = iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context;
+- iakerb_mechanism.gss_init_sec_context = iakerb_gss_init_sec_context;
+- iakerb_mechanism.gss_delete_sec_context = iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context;
+- iakerb_mechanism.gss_acquire_cred = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred;
+- iakerb_mechanism.gssspi_acquire_cred_with_password
+- = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password;
+
+ memset(&mech_iakerb, 0, sizeof(mech_iakerb));
+ mech_iakerb.mech = &iakerb_mechanism;
+diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
+index f30de32..4662bd9 100644
+--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct _iakerb_ctx_id_rec {
+ gss_ctx_id_t gssc;
+ krb5_data conv; /* conversation for checksumming */
+ unsigned int count; /* number of round trips */
++ int initiate;
++ int established;
+ krb5_get_init_creds_opt *gic_opts;
+ };
+
+@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ iakerb_get_initial_state(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ * Allocate and initialise an IAKERB context
+ */
+ static krb5_error_code
+-iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
++iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx, int initiate)
+ {
+ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
+ krb5_error_code code;
+@@ -709,6 +711,8 @@ iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
+ ctx->magic = KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT;
+ ctx->state = IAKERB_AS_REQ;
+ ctx->count = 0;
++ ctx->initiate = initiate;
++ ctx->established = 0;
+
+ code = krb5_gss_init_context(&ctx->k5c);
+ if (code != 0)
+@@ -732,7 +736,7 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
+ gss_buffer_t output_token)
+ {
+- OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
+
+ if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
+ output_token->length = 0;
+@@ -740,23 +744,10 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ }
+
+ *minor_status = 0;
++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
++ iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
+
+- if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+- iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
+-
+- if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) {
+- iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
+- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+- } else {
+- assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT);
+-
+- major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
+- context_handle,
+- output_token);
+- }
+- }
+-
+- return major_status;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ static krb5_boolean
+@@ -802,7 +793,7 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
+
+ if (initialContextToken) {
+- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 0);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+@@ -854,11 +845,8 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ time_rec,
+ delegated_cred_handle,
+ &exts);
+- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+- *context_handle = ctx->gssc;
+- ctx->gssc = NULL;
+- iakerb_release_context(ctx);
+- }
++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ ctx->established = 1;
+ if (mech_type != NULL)
+ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
+ }
+@@ -897,7 +885,7 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
+
+ if (initialContextToken) {
+- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 1);
+ if (code != 0) {
+ *minor_status = code;
+ goto cleanup;
+@@ -983,11 +971,8 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ ret_flags,
+ time_rec,
+ &exts);
+- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+- *context_handle = ctx->gssc;
+- ctx->gssc = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+- iakerb_release_context(ctx);
+- }
++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ ctx->established = 1;
+ if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
+ *actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
+ } else {
+@@ -1010,3 +995,309 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+
+ return major_status;
+ }
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_unwrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, input_message_buffer,
++ output_message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_wrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
++ input_message_buffer, conf_state,
++ output_message_buffer);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
++
++ return krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
++ token_buffer);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ OM_uint32 *time_rec)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, ctx->gssc, time_rec);
++}
++
++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
++{
++ OM_uint32 maj;
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
++ if (!ctx->established)
++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
++
++ maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
++ interprocess_token);
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
++ iakerb_release_context(ctx);
++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
++ }
++ return maj;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO exported
++ * context tokens, only tokens for the underlying krb5 context. So we do not
++ * need to implement an iakerb_gss_import_sec_context() yet; it would be
++ * unreachable except via a manually constructed token.
++ */
++
++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t *src_name,
++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
++ int *initiate, int *opened)
++{
++ OM_uint32 ret;
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (src_name != NULL)
++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ if (targ_name != NULL)
++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
++ *lifetime_rec = 0;
++ if (mech_type != NULL)
++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
++ *ctx_flags = 0;
++ if (initiate != NULL)
++ *initiate = ctx->initiate;
++ if (opened != NULL)
++ *opened = ctx->established;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++
++ ret = krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, ctx->gssc, src_name,
++ targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type,
++ ctx_flags, initiate, opened);
++
++ if (!ctx->established) {
++ /* Report IAKERB as the mech OID until the context is established. */
++ if (mech_type != NULL)
++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
++
++ /* We don't support exporting partially-established contexts. */
++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
++ }
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size,
++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag,
++ qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
++ gss_buffer_t message_token)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_get_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, message_buffer,
++ message_token);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, msg_buffer,
++ token_buffer, qop_state);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ const gss_OID desired_object,
++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
++
++ return krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
++ desired_object, data_set);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
++ const gss_OID desired_object,
++ const gss_buffer_t value)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
++
++ return krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
++ desired_object, value);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
++ conf_state, iov, iov_count);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_state, qop_state,
++ iov, iov_count);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag,
++ qop_req, conf_state, iov, iov_count);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t prf_out)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_pseudo_random(minor_status, ctx->gssc, prf_key, prf_in,
++ desired_output_len, prf_out);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
++ int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, iov,
++ iov_count);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
++ int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_state, iov,
++ iov_count);
++}
++
++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
++{
++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
++
++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
++
++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, iov,
++ iov_count);
++}
diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af2f42a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:51:47 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]
+
+In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
+copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
+bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug
+affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
+krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
+affected.
+
+CVE-2015-2697:
+
+In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
+cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
+beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
+answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
+krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this
+function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
+realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
+Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
+the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.
+
+CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
+
+ticket: 8252 (new)
+target_version: 1.14
+tags: pullup
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
+index ab6fed8..8604268 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
+@@ -40,10 +40,8 @@ build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
+ data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
+ if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
+
+- if (!retval) {
+- r = strdup(realm);
+- if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
+- }
++ if (!retval)
++ r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval);
+
+ while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
+ if (count == size) {
--
2.6.2
---
Unsubscribe: alpine-aports+unsubscribe@lists.alpinelinux.org
Help: alpine-aports+help@lists.alpinelinux.org
---
This patch applies against against the 3.2-stable branch.
Christian Kampka <christian@kampka.net> schrieb am Di., 1. Dez. 2015 um
23:14 Uhr:
> fixes: #4836
> ---
> main/krb5/APKBUILD | 18 +-
> main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch | 101 ++++++
> main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch | 564 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch | 731
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch | 50 +++
> 5 files changed, 1463 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
> create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
> create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
> create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
>
> diff --git a/main/krb5/APKBUILD b/main/krb5/APKBUILD
> index d3ddfc9..fef6004 100644
> --- a/main/krb5/APKBUILD
> +++ b/main/krb5/APKBUILD
> @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
> pkgname=krb5
> pkgver=1.13.1
> -pkgrel=1
> +pkgrel=2
>
> case $pkgver in
> *.*.*) _ver=${pkgver%.*};;
> @@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-server
> $pkgname-server-ldap:ldap $pkgname-pkinit $pkgname-libs"
> source="
> http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/${_ver}/krb5-$pkgver-signed.tar
> mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
> + CVE-2015-2694.patch
> + CVE-2015-2695.patch
> + CVE-2015-2696.patch
> + CVE-2015-2697.patch
>
> krb5kadmind.initd
> krb5kdc.initd
> @@ -120,16 +124,28 @@ libs() {
>
> md5sums="567586cdf02aa8c842c2fab7a94f3c1f krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
> c84a0c7d8014e3528524956ffdd1c3e9 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
> +98d4792ff9576efab658be312ef7623f CVE-2015-2694.patch
> +ca73fdd31a2d5c38993afbed909b5417 CVE-2015-2695.patch
> +dc4c2a99b5b8a9bf7b306d614134c267 CVE-2015-2696.patch
> +a2369d91ccef67f093af594d941ebc11 CVE-2015-2697.patch
> 9c0e3bac122326cdbbbac068056ee8af krb5kadmind.initd
> 71131479c07a2d89b30a2ea18dd64e74 krb5kdc.initd
> d94873a6a1ac6277adf2d25458eda9e5 krb5kpropd.initd"
> sha256sums="4df629fdf97f362cf81edbf38d613b32b492dd88c876cf3aa1c66562f296663e
> krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
> 84007c7423f67db7a8b248b9643c49ef25f2d56ce15c2574eb41ecbf51bcd3f2
> mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
> +f3710f2f90542145a8921dc7c2b8241d8fdeccdcba3d50b1758aa0e2f8aeec73
> CVE-2015-2694.patch
> +b83dd0714f1ab164f6eb50d173bec25bb851c739ed5b1c38b35e7a1910cff25b
> CVE-2015-2695.patch
> +add426d86d31c57dc8e1c1d9043f61c21f2e532e728d1d9c703b2616bf246d7c
> CVE-2015-2696.patch
> +e1d3d6a0dfede9d5a4af83d51c4f5fad13e917e4cb58672ff0ee3e8f34fe0379
> CVE-2015-2697.patch
> 213a5b04f091e4644e856aabc38da586bd86c4616ab15f00eefca52fca7137d6
> krb5kadmind.initd
> 577842c7fe4639a8e9dd349da40e514284dd53440bb71be58283faaf18508f9a
> krb5kdc.initd
> 1644639d83791bd871f3c89a53a7052ab52994d3ef03d1d675d4217130c1fa94
> krb5kpropd.initd"
> sha512sums="f26dce8f682bd3fbf38a15df5f91722b573d4df4cc193f7ba8dc369cbbee8f4bc2a72f56513d2cf27697ce8baaf954afe04e3eefc15c2883fa1d5260145aef6e
> krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar
> 5a3782ff17b383f8cd0415fd13538ab56afd788130d6ad640e9f2682b7deaae7f25713ce358058ed771091040dccf62a3bc87e6fd473d505ec189a95debcc801
> mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch
> +0c8ab8a1d6bfa31b3257c1ac4f99d9c14d4f8ed0c27da0e648f64e9e5e5717ca5d929def6fd1f04903b287786add4a93e8f1c1f96cea14d123c1574c174a532a
> CVE-2015-2694.patch
> +4e1499d799bed90b2857d24de29ea3bb7500b514a86c2a8f4596fb80f97f01445b7dd9d0cb19c1cfb1f03f5c6a8e2a2149a6278c720933181db8e188063dcc6a
> CVE-2015-2695.patch
> +d27e836a3e8a1ca6b711c0ce4f9f68cbd42d888cb9dcaf2dcb78fdc9ca7652865c124e14c7026b4e94a722a314a0c30f732cc00344973ee5a180f11901347ed1
> CVE-2015-2696.patch
> +5f6a630b566c9f0cb02528fca3a789547e294acf5f3435eb62b79411187e4fcaaa58b81eff34e8ac6cbca3dacb076bd626a31687c04936b35bf7ab3e35965a31
> CVE-2015-2697.patch
> 43b9885b7eb8d0d60920def688de482f2b1701288f9acb1bb21dc76b2395428ff304961959eb04ba5eafd0412bae35668d6d2c8223424b9337bc051eadf51682
> krb5kadmind.initd
> ede15f15bbbc9d0227235067abe15245bb9713aea260d397379c63275ce74aea0db6c91c15d599e40c6e89612d76f3a0f8fdd21cbafa3f30d426d4310d3e2cec
> krb5kdc.initd
> 45be0d421efd41e9dd056125a750c90856586e990317456b68170d733b03cba9ecd18ab87603b20e49575e7839fb4a6d628255533f2631f9e8ddb7f3cc493a90
> krb5kpropd.initd"
> diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..6154965
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
> +From df8afc60d970a7176a55ffe7ce21cfd57ba423cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
> +Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 12:02:37 -0400
> +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
> +
> +In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
> +the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
> +module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
> +realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
> +erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
> +
> +CVE-2015-2694:
> +
> +In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
> +support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
> +requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
> +encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
> +used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
> +password.
> +
> + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
> +
> +(cherry picked from commit e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604)
> +
> +ticket: 8160
> +version_fixed: 1.13.2
> +status: resolved
> +---
> + src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c | 10 +++++++---
> + src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 4 ++--
> + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
> b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
> +index bf9c6a8..7941b4a 100644
> +--- a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
> ++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c
> +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static krb5_preauthtype otp_pa_type_list[] =
> + struct request_state {
> + krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond;
> + void *arg;
> ++ krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply;
> + };
> +
> + static krb5_error_code
> +@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ on_response(void *data, krb5_error_code retval,
> otp_response response)
> + if (retval == 0 && response != otp_response_success)
> + retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
> +
> ++ if (retval == 0)
> ++ rs.enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
> ++
> + rs.respond(rs.arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> + }
> +
> +@@ -263,8 +267,6 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt,
> krb5_kdc_req *request,
> + krb5_data d, plaintext;
> + char *config;
> +
> +- enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
> +-
> + /* Get the FAST armor key. */
> + armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
> + if (armor_key == NULL) {
> +@@ -298,12 +300,14 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data
> *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
> + goto error;
> + }
> +
> +- /* Create the request state. */
> ++ /* Create the request state. Save the response callback, and the
> ++ * enc_tkt_reply pointer so we can set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH flag
> later. */
> + rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval);
> + if (rs == NULL)
> + goto error;
> + rs->arg = arg;
> + rs->respond = respond;
> ++ rs->enc_tkt_reply = enc_tkt_reply;
> +
> + /* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */
> + retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
> +diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
> b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
> +index 5639fca..edfce6f 100644
> +--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
> ++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
> +@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
> +
> + pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
> + if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
> +- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> ++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> +@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
> +
> + plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata,
> request->server);
> + if (plgctx == NULL) {
> +- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> ++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..08bc8ab
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
> +From b51b33f2bc5d1497ddf5bd107f791c101695000d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:27:52 -0400
> +Subject: [PATCH] Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
> +
> +The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
> +mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
> +most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
> +assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
> +programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
> +establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
> +opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
> +gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
> +
> +CVE-2015-2695:
> +
> +In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
> +gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
> +cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
> +generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
> +the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
> +after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
> +applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
> +bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
> +gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
> +results, but applications should not make access control decisions
> +based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
> +
> + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
> +
> +[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
> +behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
> +
> +ticket: 8244
> +target_version: 1.14
> +tags: pullup
> +---
> + src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h | 2 +
> + src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 254
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> + 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
> b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
> +index 57372de..5c82764 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
> ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h
> +@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ typedef struct {
> + int firstpass;
> + int mech_complete;
> + int nego_done;
> ++ int initiate;
> ++ int opened;
> + OM_uint32 ctx_flags;
> + gss_name_t internal_name;
> + gss_OID actual_mech;
> +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
> b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
> +index ef76e1f..7849c85 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
> ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c
> +@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static OM_uint32 get_negotiable_mechs(OM_uint32 *,
> spnego_gss_cred_id_t,
> + gss_cred_usage_t, gss_OID_set *);
> + static void release_spnego_ctx(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *);
> + static void check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t);
> +-static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(void);
> ++static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(int);
> + static int put_mech_set(gss_OID_set mechSet, gss_buffer_t buf);
> + static int put_input_token(unsigned char **, gss_buffer_t, unsigned int);
> + static int put_mech_oid(unsigned char **, gss_OID_const, unsigned int);
> +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx)
> + }
> +
> + static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t
> +-create_spnego_ctx(void)
> ++create_spnego_ctx(int initiate)
> + {
> + spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL;
> + spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)
> +@@ -477,6 +477,8 @@ create_spnego_ctx(void)
> + spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0;
> + spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0;
> + spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0;
> ++ spnego_ctx->opened = 0;
> ++ spnego_ctx->initiate = initiate;
> + spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> + spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
> +
> +@@ -642,7 +644,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> + spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL;
> +
> +- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
> ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(1);
> + if (sc == NULL)
> + return GSS_S_FAILURE;
> +
> +@@ -659,10 +661,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +- /*
> +- * The actual context is not yet determined, set the output
> +- * context handle to refer to the spnego context itself.
> +- */
> ++
> + sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> + *ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc;
> + sc = NULL;
> +@@ -1108,16 +1107,11 @@ spnego_gss_init_sec_context(
> + }
> + gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out);
> + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
> +- /*
> +- * Now, switch the output context to refer to the
> +- * negotiated mechanism's context.
> +- */
> +- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle;
> ++ spnego_ctx->opened = 1;
> + if (actual_mech != NULL)
> + *actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech;
> + if (ret_flags != NULL)
> + *ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags;
> +- release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx);
> + } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
> + if (spnego_ctx != NULL) {
> + gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin,
> +@@ -1285,7 +1279,7 @@ acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> +- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
> ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
> + if (sc == NULL) {
> + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
> + goto cleanup;
> +@@ -1367,7 +1361,7 @@ acc_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &sc->DER_mechTypes);
> + assert(mech_wanted != GSS_C_NO_OID);
> + } else
> +- sc = create_spnego_ctx();
> ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0);
> + if (sc == NULL) {
> + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
> + *return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
> +@@ -1750,13 +1744,12 @@ spnego_gss_accept_sec_context(
> + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
> + }
> + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
> +- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc->ctx_handle;
> ++ sc->opened = 1;
> + if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
> + src_name != NULL) {
> + *src_name = sc->internal_name;
> + sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> + }
> +- release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
> + } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
> + if (sc != NULL) {
> + gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
> +@@ -2069,8 +2062,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap(
> + gss_qop_t *qop_state)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + input_message_buffer,
> + output_message_buffer,
> + conf_state,
> +@@ -2090,8 +2088,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap(
> + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_wrap(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_req_flag,
> + qop_req,
> + input_message_buffer,
> +@@ -2108,8 +2111,14 @@ spnego_gss_process_context_token(
> + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ /* SPNEGO doesn't have its own context tokens. */
> ++ if (!sc->opened)
> ++ return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
> ++
> + ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + token_buffer);
> +
> + return (ret);
> +@@ -2133,19 +2142,9 @@ spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
> + if (*ctx == NULL)
> + return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
> +
> +- /*
> +- * If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
> +- */
> +- if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
> +- (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
> +- &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
> +- output_token);
> +- (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
> +- } else {
> +- ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> +- output_token);
> +- }
> ++ (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
> ++ output_token);
> ++ (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
> +
> + return (ret);
> + }
> +@@ -2157,8 +2156,13 @@ spnego_gss_context_time(
> + OM_uint32 *time_rec)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_context_time(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + time_rec);
> + return (ret);
> + }
> +@@ -2170,9 +2174,20 @@ spnego_gss_export_sec_context(
> + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = *(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established
> ++ * contexts. */
> ++ if (!sc->opened)
> ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
> ++
> + ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ &sc->ctx_handle,
> + interprocess_token);
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
> ++ release_spnego_ctx(&sc);
> ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++ }
> + return (ret);
> + }
> +
> +@@ -2182,11 +2197,12 @@ spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
> + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
> + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
> + {
> +- OM_uint32 ret;
> +- ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status,
> +- interprocess_token,
> +- context_handle);
> +- return (ret);
> ++ /*
> ++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO
> ++ * exported context tokens, only tokens for underlying mechs. So
> just
> ++ * return an error for now.
> ++ */
> ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
> + }
> + #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
> +
> +@@ -2203,16 +2219,48 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_context(
> + int *opened)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (src_name != NULL)
> ++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> ++ if (targ_name != NULL)
> ++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> ++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
> ++ *lifetime_rec = 0;
> ++ if (mech_type != NULL)
> ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
> ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
> ++ *ctx_flags = 0;
> ++ if (locally_initiated != NULL)
> ++ *locally_initiated = sc->initiate;
> ++ if (opened != NULL)
> ++ *opened = sc->opened;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
> ++ ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle,
> ++ src_name, targ_name,
> lifetime_rec,
> ++ mech_type, ctx_flags, NULL,
> NULL);
> ++ }
> +
> +- ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> +- src_name,
> +- targ_name,
> +- lifetime_rec,
> +- mech_type,
> +- ctx_flags,
> +- locally_initiated,
> +- opened);
> ++ if (!sc->opened) {
> ++ /*
> ++ * We are still doing SPNEGO negotiation, so report SPNEGO
> as
> ++ * the OID. After negotiation is complete we will report
> the
> ++ * underlying mechanism OID.
> ++ */
> ++ if (mech_type != NULL)
> ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego;
> ++
> ++ /*
> ++ * Remove flags we don't support with partially-established
> ++ * contexts. (Change this to keep GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG if we
> add
> ++ * support for exporting partial SPNEGO contexts.)
> ++ */
> ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) {
> ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG;
> ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> +
> + return (ret);
> + }
> +@@ -2227,8 +2275,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
> + OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_req_flag,
> + qop_req,
> + req_output_size,
> +@@ -2245,8 +2298,13 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic(
> + gss_buffer_t message_token)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + qop_req,
> + message_buffer,
> + message_token);
> +@@ -2262,8 +2320,13 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic(
> + gss_qop_t *qop_state)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + msg_buffer,
> + token_buffer,
> + qop_state);
> +@@ -2278,8 +2341,14 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
> + gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function. */
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
> ++
> + ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + desired_object,
> + data_set);
> + return (ret);
> +@@ -2359,8 +2428,15 @@ spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
> + const gss_buffer_t value)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
> ++
> ++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function, and we
> cannot
> ++ * construct an empty SPNEGO context with it. */
> ++ if (sc == NULL || sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
> ++
> + ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ &sc->ctx_handle,
> + desired_object,
> + value);
> + return (ret);
> +@@ -2377,8 +2453,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_req_flag,
> + qop_req,
> + input_assoc_buffer,
> +@@ -2399,8 +2480,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_qop_t *qop_state)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + input_message_buffer,
> + input_assoc_buffer,
> + output_payload_buffer,
> +@@ -2419,8 +2505,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + int iov_count)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_req_flag,
> + qop_req,
> + conf_state,
> +@@ -2438,8 +2529,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + int iov_count)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_state,
> + qop_state,
> + iov,
> +@@ -2457,8 +2553,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + int iov_count)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + conf_req_flag,
> + qop_req,
> + conf_state,
> +@@ -2475,8 +2576,13 @@ spnego_gss_complete_auth_token(
> + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE);
> ++
> + ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + input_message_buffer);
> + return (ret);
> + }
> +@@ -2721,8 +2827,13 @@ spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_buffer_t prf_out)
> + {
> + OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> + ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status,
> +- context,
> ++ sc->ctx_handle,
> + prf_key,
> + prf_in,
> + desired_output_len,
> +@@ -2863,7 +2974,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> + gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> + int iov_count)
> + {
> +- return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> ++ return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov,
> + iov_count);
> + }
> +
> +@@ -2872,7 +2988,12 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> + gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> + int iov_count)
> + {
> +- return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_state,
> iov,
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> ++ return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_state,
> iov,
> + iov_count);
> + }
> +
> +@@ -2881,7 +3002,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32
> *minor_status,
> + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t
> qop_req,
> + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
> + {
> +- return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req,
> iov,
> ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
> ++
> ++ return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req,
> iov,
> + iov_count);
> + }
> +
> diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..c1f50a5
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
> +From e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:28:36 -0400
> +Subject: [PATCH] Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
> +
> +The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
> +krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
> +most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
> +assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
> +programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
> +establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
> +type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
> +structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
> +establishment.
> +
> +CVE-2015-2696:
> +
> +In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
> +gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
> +cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
> +generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
> +native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
> +IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
> +with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
> +access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
> +to context establishment.
> +
> + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
> +
> +[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
> +behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
> +
> +ticket: 8244
> +target_version: 1.14
> +tags: pullup
> +---
> + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h | 114 ++++++++++++
> + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c | 105 +++++++++--
> + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c | 351
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> + 3 files changed, 529 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
> b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
> +index 9aae12a..97e090d 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
> ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h
> +@@ -621,6 +621,21 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext
> + );
> + #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
> +
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid
> ++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
> ++ const gss_ctx_id_t,
> ++ /* context_handle */
> ++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */
> ++ gss_buffer_set_t* /* data_set */
> ++);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option
> ++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */
> ++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */
> ++ const gss_buffer_t/* value */
> ++);
> ++
> + OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_process_context_token
> + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */
> + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */
> +@@ -1302,6 +1317,105 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> + krb5_gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_buffer_t token,
> + gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle);
> +
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ OM_uint32 *time_rec);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t
> *src_name,
> ++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32
> *lifetime_rec,
> ++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
> ++ int *locally_initiated, int *opened);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
> ++ gss_buffer_t message_token);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> ++ int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t
> qop_req,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> ++ int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
> ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int
> *conf_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
> ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size,
> ++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size);
> ++
> ++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token);
> ++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ const gss_OID desired_object,
> ++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> ++ const gss_OID desired_object,
> ++ const gss_buffer_t value);
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
> ++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t
> prf_out);
> ++
> + /* Magic string to identify exported krb5 GSS credentials. Increment
> this if
> + * the format changes. */
> + #define CRED_EXPORT_MAGIC "K5C1"
> +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
> b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
> +index 0be92e4..c4dfdd6 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
> ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c
> +@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct {
> + }
> + };
> +
> +-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> + krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> + const gss_OID desired_object,
> +@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static struct {
> + };
> + #endif
> +
> +-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> + krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> + const gss_OID desired_object,
> +@@ -929,20 +929,103 @@ static struct gss_config krb5_mechanism = {
> + krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length,
> + };
> +
> ++/* Functions which use security contexts or acquire creds are
> IAKERB-specific;
> ++ * other functions can borrow from the krb5 mech. */
> ++static struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = {
> ++ { GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID_LENGTH, GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID },
> ++ NULL,
> ++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred,
> ++ krb5_gss_release_cred,
> ++ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context,
> ++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT
> ++ NULL,
> ++#else
> ++ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context,
> ++#endif
> ++ iakerb_gss_process_context_token,
> ++ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context,
> ++ iakerb_gss_context_time,
> ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic,
> ++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic,
> ++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_WRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE)
> ++ NULL,
> ++#else
> ++ iakerb_gss_wrap,
> ++#endif
> ++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_UNWRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE)
> ++ NULL,
> ++#else
> ++ iakerb_gss_unwrap,
> ++#endif
> ++ krb5_gss_display_status,
> ++ krb5_gss_indicate_mechs,
> ++ krb5_gss_compare_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_display_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_import_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_release_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred,
> ++ NULL, /* add_cred */
> ++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT
> ++ NULL,
> ++ NULL,
> ++#else
> ++ iakerb_gss_export_sec_context,
> ++ NULL,
> ++#endif
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_mech,
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_names_for_mech,
> ++ iakerb_gss_inquire_context,
> ++ krb5_gss_internal_release_oid,
> ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit,
> ++ krb5_gss_localname,
> ++ krb5_gss_authorize_localname,
> ++ krb5_gss_export_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_duplicate_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_store_cred,
> ++ iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid,
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_oid,
> ++ iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option,
> ++ krb5_gssspi_set_cred_option,
> ++ krb5_gssspi_mech_invoke,
> ++ NULL, /* wrap_aead */
> ++ NULL, /* unwrap_aead */
> ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov,
> ++ iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov,
> ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length,
> ++ NULL, /* complete_auth_token */
> ++ NULL, /* acquire_cred_impersonate_name */
> ++ NULL, /* add_cred_impersonate_name */
> ++ NULL, /* display_name_ext */
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_name,
> ++ krb5_gss_get_name_attribute,
> ++ krb5_gss_set_name_attribute,
> ++ krb5_gss_delete_name_attribute,
> ++ krb5_gss_export_name_composite,
> ++ krb5_gss_map_name_to_any,
> ++ krb5_gss_release_any_name_mapping,
> ++ iakerb_gss_pseudo_random,
> ++ NULL, /* set_neg_mechs */
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_saslname_for_mech,
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_mech_for_saslname,
> ++ krb5_gss_inquire_attrs_for_mech,
> ++ krb5_gss_acquire_cred_from,
> ++ krb5_gss_store_cred_into,
> ++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password,
> ++ krb5_gss_export_cred,
> ++ krb5_gss_import_cred,
> ++ NULL, /* import_sec_context_by_mech */
> ++ NULL, /* import_name_by_mech */
> ++ NULL, /* import_cred_by_mech */
> ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov,
> ++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov,
> ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length,
> ++};
> ++
> + #ifdef _GSS_STATIC_LINK
> + #include "mglueP.h"
> + static int gss_iakerbmechglue_init(void)
> + {
> + struct gss_mech_config mech_iakerb;
> +- struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = krb5_mechanism;
> +-
> +- /* IAKERB mechanism mirrors krb5, but with different context SPIs */
> +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_accept_sec_context =
> iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context;
> +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_init_sec_context =
> iakerb_gss_init_sec_context;
> +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_delete_sec_context =
> iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context;
> +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_acquire_cred = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred;
> +- iakerb_mechanism.gssspi_acquire_cred_with_password
> +- =
> iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password;
> +
> + memset(&mech_iakerb, 0, sizeof(mech_iakerb));
> + mech_iakerb.mech = &iakerb_mechanism;
> +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
> +index f30de32..4662bd9 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
> ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c
> +@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct _iakerb_ctx_id_rec {
> + gss_ctx_id_t gssc;
> + krb5_data conv; /* conversation for checksumming
> */
> + unsigned int count; /* number of round trips */
> ++ int initiate;
> ++ int established;
> + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *gic_opts;
> + };
> +
> +@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ iakerb_get_initial_state(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx,
> + * Allocate and initialise an IAKERB context
> + */
> + static krb5_error_code
> +-iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
> ++iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx, int initiate)
> + {
> + iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
> + krb5_error_code code;
> +@@ -709,6 +711,8 @@ iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
> + ctx->magic = KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT;
> + ctx->state = IAKERB_AS_REQ;
> + ctx->count = 0;
> ++ ctx->initiate = initiate;
> ++ ctx->established = 0;
> +
> + code = krb5_gss_init_context(&ctx->k5c);
> + if (code != 0)
> +@@ -732,7 +736,7 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> + gss_buffer_t output_token)
> + {
> +- OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
> +
> + if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
> + output_token->length = 0;
> +@@ -740,23 +744,10 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32
> *minor_status,
> + }
> +
> + *minor_status = 0;
> ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++ iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
> +
> +- if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
> +- iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
> +-
> +- if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) {
> +- iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
> +- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> +- } else {
> +- assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT);
> +-
> +- major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
> +- context_handle,
> +- output_token);
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- return major_status;
> ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> + }
> +
> + static krb5_boolean
> +@@ -802,7 +793,7 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
> +
> + if (initialContextToken) {
> +- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
> ++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 0);
> + if (code != 0)
> + goto cleanup;
> +
> +@@ -854,11 +845,8 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32
> *minor_status,
> + time_rec,
> +
> delegated_cred_handle,
> + &exts);
> +- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
> +- *context_handle = ctx->gssc;
> +- ctx->gssc = NULL;
> +- iakerb_release_context(ctx);
> +- }
> ++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
> ++ ctx->established = 1;
> + if (mech_type != NULL)
> + *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
> + }
> +@@ -897,7 +885,7 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
> +
> + if (initialContextToken) {
> +- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
> ++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 1);
> + if (code != 0) {
> + *minor_status = code;
> + goto cleanup;
> +@@ -983,11 +971,8 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> + ret_flags,
> + time_rec,
> + &exts);
> +- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
> +- *context_handle = ctx->gssc;
> +- ctx->gssc = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> +- iakerb_release_context(ctx);
> +- }
> ++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
> ++ ctx->established = 1;
> + if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
> + *actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
> + } else {
> +@@ -1010,3 +995,309 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32
> *minor_status,
> +
> + return major_status;
> + }
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
> ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_unwrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, input_message_buffer,
> ++ output_message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
> ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_wrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
> ++ input_message_buffer, conf_state,
> ++ output_message_buffer);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
> ++ token_buffer);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ OM_uint32 *time_rec)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, ctx->gssc, time_rec);
> ++}
> ++
> ++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
> ++{
> ++ OM_uint32 maj;
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established
> contexts. */
> ++ if (!ctx->established)
> ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
> ++
> ++ maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
> ++ interprocess_token);
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
> ++ iakerb_release_context(ctx);
> ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++ }
> ++ return maj;
> ++}
> ++
> ++/*
> ++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO
> exported
> ++ * context tokens, only tokens for the underlying krb5 context. So we
> do not
> ++ * need to implement an iakerb_gss_import_sec_context() yet; it would be
> ++ * unreachable except via a manually constructed token.
> ++ */
> ++
> ++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t
> *src_name,
> ++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32
> *lifetime_rec,
> ++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
> ++ int *initiate, int *opened)
> ++{
> ++ OM_uint32 ret;
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (src_name != NULL)
> ++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> ++ if (targ_name != NULL)
> ++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
> ++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
> ++ *lifetime_rec = 0;
> ++ if (mech_type != NULL)
> ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
> ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
> ++ *ctx_flags = 0;
> ++ if (initiate != NULL)
> ++ *initiate = ctx->initiate;
> ++ if (opened != NULL)
> ++ *opened = ctx->established;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> ++
> ++ ret = krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, ctx->gssc, src_name,
> ++ targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type,
> ++ ctx_flags, initiate, opened);
> ++
> ++ if (!ctx->established) {
> ++ /* Report IAKERB as the mech OID until the context is
> established. */
> ++ if (mech_type != NULL)
> ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
> ++
> ++ /* We don't support exporting partially-established contexts. */
> ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL)
> ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ return ret;
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size,
> ++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ qop_req, req_output_size,
> max_input_size);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
> ++ gss_buffer_t message_token)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req,
> message_buffer,
> ++ message_token);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, msg_buffer,
> ++ token_buffer, qop_state);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ const gss_OID desired_object,
> ++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
> ++ desired_object, data_set);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
> ++ const gss_OID desired_object,
> ++ const gss_buffer_t value)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
> ++ desired_object, value);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
> ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int
> *conf_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag,
> qop_req,
> ++ conf_state, iov, iov_count);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_state,
> qop_state,
> ++ iov, iov_count);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc,
> conf_req_flag,
> ++ qop_req, conf_state, iov, iov_count);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in,
> ++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t
> prf_out)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_pseudo_random(minor_status, ctx->gssc, prf_key,
> prf_in,
> ++ desired_output_len, prf_out);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> ++ int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, iov,
> ++ iov_count);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t
> context_handle,
> ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
> ++ int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_state,
> iov,
> ++ iov_count);
> ++}
> ++
> ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV
> ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t
> qop_req,
> ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
> ++{
> ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
> ++
> ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
> ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
> ++
> ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req,
> iov,
> ++ iov_count);
> ++}
> diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..af2f42a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
> +From f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
> +Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:51:47 -0400
> +Subject: [PATCH] Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]
> +
> +In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
> +copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
> +bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug
> +affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
> +krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
> +affected.
> +
> +CVE-2015-2697:
> +
> +In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
> +cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
> +beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
> +answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
> +krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this
> +function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
> +realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
> +Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
> +the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.
> +
> +CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
> +
> +ticket: 8252 (new)
> +target_version: 1.14
> +tags: pullup
> +---
> + src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c | 6 ++----
> + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
> +index ab6fed8..8604268 100644
> +--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
> ++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c
> +@@ -40,10 +40,8 @@ build_principal_va(krb5_context context,
> krb5_principal princ,
> + data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
> + if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
> +
> +- if (!retval) {
> +- r = strdup(realm);
> +- if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
> +- }
> ++ if (!retval)
> ++ r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval);
> +
> + while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
> + if (count == size) {
> --
> 2.6.2
>
>