---
main/freetype/APKBUILD | 23 ++++++++++----------
main/freetype/CVE-2017-8105.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/freetype/CVE-2017-8287.patch | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 main/freetype/CVE-2017-8105.patch
create mode 100644 main/freetype/CVE-2017-8287.patch
diff --git a/main/freetype/APKBUILD b/main/freetype/APKBUILD
index d693f82d66..6043cdde0c 100644
--- a/main/freetype/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/freetype/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Maintainer: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@gmail.com>
pkgname=freetype
pkgver=2.7.1
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="TrueType font rendering library"
url="http://freetype.sourceforge.net"
arch="all"
@@ -16,8 +16,15 @@ source="http://download.savannah.gnu.org/releases/freetype/freetype-$pkgver.tar.
0001-Enable-table-validation-modules.patch
0002-Enable-subpixel-rendering.patch
0003-Enable-infinality-subpixel-hinting.patch
+ CVE-2017-8105.patch
+ CVE-2017-8287.patch
"
+# secfixes:
+# 2.7.1-r1:
+# - CVE-2017-8105
+# - CVE-2017-8287
+
builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver"
build() {
@@ -43,18 +50,10 @@ package() {
ln -s freetype2 "$pkgdir"/usr/include/freetype
}
-md5sums="b3230110e0cab777e0df7631837ac36e freetype-2.7.1.tar.bz2
-4e87d814f54a8047c3b8c4f7f01af5ff 40-memcpy-fix.patch
-cf20a9583d164ffbdb2e5daeea679481 0001-Enable-table-validation-modules.patch
-8814c204656c808588d79348ee5e292e 0002-Enable-subpixel-rendering.patch
-febde7721bbb4e3276840bc242930848 0003-Enable-infinality-subpixel-hinting.patch"
-sha256sums="3a3bb2c4e15ffb433f2032f50a5b5a92558206822e22bfe8cbe339af4aa82f88 freetype-2.7.1.tar.bz2
-b613951938c03d2ab35a7320dd60c8fb14951877bc17b7da57d4c93d3cd44298 40-memcpy-fix.patch
-6d273254fd925d284e5f66e3861eaef69a4393f34872398b2c93af0d5e15d34e 0001-Enable-table-validation-modules.patch
-9da762d69d85ca825a8e4578aaaeba28aa17b8d8a3bca29929c4786b3a82c104 0002-Enable-subpixel-rendering.patch
-d043fa4ce22b6e6cfafa0d2e2898b1c5cd000ec66094a97ab57c9126934ba371 0003-Enable-infinality-subpixel-hinting.patch"
sha512sums="df39e2ef55f9090a66fecb6b5e9a5d296a043ddfd919d0ce3d7ea5132aa388bfbbeeaa6d6df6513956134b987e1c3a5eac6975c0c9631213af77457a623b49da freetype-2.7.1.tar.bz2
9981be8a3ea6f2cf856860b87a4e895e4610c9d5ea4beb611815e757e6080e060f6853ace02dd8ea55e5888cdf4bae5ad5eadd2d8a123754bb3c0bfe7ef41dea 40-memcpy-fix.patch
41a84be2631b53072a76b78c582575aa48b650ee7b00017d018381002bc25df10cf33da4954c95ef50db39f1fa566678e3b4ae9bfee1dfd705423fb53e53e494 0001-Enable-table-validation-modules.patch
65be5283f5050e9d6ebe1c6808ec28bb46d5290ee84aede570977b66988eeb674524d0a834dbb2999a487e3a85ca292774212dadc5a3e713e1f5b8a80d75ddf3 0002-Enable-subpixel-rendering.patch
-7b52a3d67750d59b2c98e83dab4e0a0ab263142c2ca7bd5f8be5f8fe9cd1dc1f4debad44111c7886665329d8d2a3163756455618a6615df8f85d82bb0372d4dd 0003-Enable-infinality-subpixel-hinting.patch"
+7b52a3d67750d59b2c98e83dab4e0a0ab263142c2ca7bd5f8be5f8fe9cd1dc1f4debad44111c7886665329d8d2a3163756455618a6615df8f85d82bb0372d4dd 0003-Enable-infinality-subpixel-hinting.patch
+b781e831289d0e24ce7901a23f3d8bade164a12ac1ffcc8efdec506507cee73fac127b0fa7c4fd98533400077a38308f2012ba1ba89d020bec00fd04041b2344 CVE-2017-8105.patch
+6dc050e68ced0227e56a61b960e90acec46e984e6c8c70c2604df48eb860ffa946bed7926e0342ef928d3c2b61acb012abc565c0b3bad9324e86f3688180f8a3 CVE-2017-8287.patch"
diff --git a/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8105.patch b/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8105.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b42ae37d7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8105.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From f958c48ee431bef8d4d466b40c9cb2d4dbcb7791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Lemberg <wl@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 09:15:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [psaux] Better protect `flex' handling.
+
+Reported as
+
+ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=935
+
+* src/psaux/t1decode.c (t1_decoder_parse_charstrings)
+<callothersubr>: Since there is not a single flex operator but a
+series of subroutine calls, malformed fonts can call arbitrary other
+operators after the start of a flex, possibly adding points. For
+this reason we have to check the available number of points before
+inserting a point.
+
+---
+diff --git a/src/psaux/t1decode.c b/src/psaux/t1decode.c
+index af7b465e..7dd45135 100644
+--- a/src/psaux/t1decode.c
++++ b/src/psaux/t1decode.c
+@@ -780,10 +780,19 @@
+ /* point without adding any point to the outline */
+ idx = decoder->num_flex_vectors++;
+ if ( idx > 0 && idx < 7 )
++ {
++ /* in malformed fonts it is possible to have other */
++ /* opcodes in the middle of a flex (which don't */
++ /* increase `num_flex_vectors'); we thus have to */
++ /* check whether we can add a point */
++ if ( FT_SET_ERROR( t1_builder_check_points( builder, 1 ) ) )
++ goto Syntax_Error;
++
+ t1_builder_add_point( builder,
+ x,
+ y,
+ (FT_Byte)( idx == 3 || idx == 6 ) );
++ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8287.patch b/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8287.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e33950bf9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/freetype/CVE-2017-8287.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 3774fc08b502c3e685afca098b6e8a195aded6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Lemberg <wl@gnu.org>
+Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2017 08:32:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] * src/psaux/psobjs.c (t1_builder_close_contour): Add safety
+ guard.
+
+Reported as
+
+ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=941
+
+diff --git a/src/psaux/psobjs.c b/src/psaux/psobjs.c
+index d18e821a..0baf8368 100644
+--- a/src/psaux/psobjs.c
++++ b/src/psaux/psobjs.c
+@@ -1718,6 +1718,14 @@
+ first = outline->n_contours <= 1
+ ? 0 : outline->contours[outline->n_contours - 2] + 1;
+
++ /* in malformed fonts it can happen that a contour was started */
++ /* but no points were added */
++ if ( outline->n_contours && first == outline->n_points )
++ {
++ outline->n_contours--;
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* We must not include the last point in the path if it */
+ /* is located on the first point. */
+ if ( outline->n_points > 1 )
+--
+2.11.0
+
--
2.12.2
---
Unsubscribe: alpine-aports+unsubscribe@lists.alpinelinux.org
Help: alpine-aports+help@lists.alpinelinux.org
---
---
main/mupdf/APKBUILD | 8 ++++++--
main/mupdf/CVE-2017-6060.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 main/mupdf/CVE-2017-6060.patch
diff --git a/main/mupdf/APKBUILD b/main/mupdf/APKBUILD
index b98896dd7c..d6c76afd88 100644
--- a/main/mupdf/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/mupdf/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer: Daniel Sabogal <dsabogalcc@gmail.com>
pkgname=mupdf
pkgver=1.11
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A lightweight PDF and XPS viewer"
url="http://mupdf.com"
arch="all"
@@ -17,9 +17,12 @@ options="!check"
source="http://mupdf.com/downloads/archive/$pkgname-$pkgver-source.tar.gz
shared-lib.patch
openjpeg-2.1.patch
+ CVE-2017-6060.patch
"
# secfixes:
+# 1.11-r1:
+# - CVE-2017-6060
# 1.10a-r2:
# - CVE-2017-5991
# 1.10a-r1:
@@ -84,4 +87,5 @@ _tools() {
sha512sums="501670f540e298a8126806ebbd9db8b29866f663b7bbf26c9ade1933e42f0c00ad410b9d93f3ddbfb3e45c38722869095de28d832fe3fb3703c55cc9a01dbf63 mupdf-1.11-source.tar.gz
b3ddbc22da894a8b9a0fa0c93711e2052b5d2ca29497473b6e15ffbae52faaafff9238619680de474c455ebd073c2d29ead4ff5d962fddb99f7ced27057fa77f shared-lib.patch
-f8283db9a510527e84afeeb6eea89948161899c149a559c4a699c533445b42f30e5bf520616ca69d7feb554529ad494a60c276a1eecc915723ec0f264bbc0ed0 openjpeg-2.1.patch"
+f8283db9a510527e84afeeb6eea89948161899c149a559c4a699c533445b42f30e5bf520616ca69d7feb554529ad494a60c276a1eecc915723ec0f264bbc0ed0 openjpeg-2.1.patch
+3e3f34e448967acb7772365065234c313cb014ebe6e3c3b3bcdbed2242b32ee5589ecd749d06fb4cd5f406eb37ca431e369c96b9adb3b5367d2e5296f1ca983e CVE-2017-6060.patch"
diff --git a/main/mupdf/CVE-2017-6060.patch b/main/mupdf/CVE-2017-6060.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc03f6106b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/mupdf/CVE-2017-6060.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+squashed commits:
+06a012a42c9884e3cd653e7826cff1ddec04eb6e
+e089b2e2c1d38c5696c7dfd741e21f8f3ef22b14
+
+From 05cb7595b61aa00a29f1609b75d280b589091356 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Rasmussen <sebras@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2017 10:54:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 697551: Make path and line buffers of equal size.
+
+Previously a too long line could be copied into the too short path buffer.
+
+jstest: Stop printing bogus script lines.
+---
+ platform/x11/jstest_main.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/platform/x11/jstest_main.c b/platform/x11/jstest_main.c
+index 13c3a0a3..36b32155 100644
+--- a/platform/x11/jstest_main.c
++++ b/platform/x11/jstest_main.c
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+ else if (match(&line, "OPEN"))
+ {
+- char path[1024];
++ char path[LONGLINE];
+ if (file_open)
+ pdfapp_close(&gapp);
+ if (prefix)
+@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- fprintf(stderr, "Unmatched: %s\n", line);
++ fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring line without script statement.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ while (!feof(script));
+--
+2.12.2
+
--
2.12.2
---
Unsubscribe: alpine-aports+unsubscribe@lists.alpinelinux.org
Help: alpine-aports+help@lists.alpinelinux.org
---
CVE-2016-10266
CVE-2016-10267
CVE-2016-10268
CVE-2016-10269
CVE-2016-10270
---
main/tiff/APKBUILD | 18 ++++++-
main/tiff/CVE-2016-10266.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++
main/tiff/CVE-2016-10267.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
main/tiff/CVE-2016-10268.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++
main/tiff/CVE-2016-10269.patch | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/tiff/CVE-2016-10270.patch | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 main/tiff/CVE-2016-10266.patch
create mode 100644 main/tiff/CVE-2016-10267.patch
create mode 100644 main/tiff/CVE-2016-10268.patch
create mode 100644 main/tiff/CVE-2016-10269.patch
create mode 100644 main/tiff/CVE-2016-10270.patch
diff --git a/main/tiff/APKBUILD b/main/tiff/APKBUILD
index fb15b96291..6f83689b14 100644
--- a/main/tiff/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/tiff/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com>
pkgname=tiff
pkgver=4.0.7
-pkgrel=2
+pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Provides support for the Tag Image File Format or TIFF"
url="http://www.libtiff.org/"
arch="all"
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ depends_dev="zlib-dev libjpeg-turbo-dev"
makedepends="libtool autoconf automake $depends_dev"
subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-tools"
source="http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${pkgver}.tar.gz
+ CVE-2016-10266.patch
+ CVE-2016-10267.patch
+ CVE-2016-10268.patch
+ CVE-2016-10269.patch
+ CVE-2016-10270.patch
CVE-2017-5225.patch
CVE-2017-7592.patch
CVE-2017-7593.patch
@@ -27,6 +32,12 @@ source="http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${pkgver}.tar.gz
"
# secfixes:
+# 4.0.7-r3
+# - CVE-2016-10266
+# - CVE-2016-10267
+# - CVE-2016-10268
+# - CVE-2016-10269
+# - CVE-2016-10270
# 4.0.7-r2:
# - CVE-2017-7592
# - CVE-2017-7593
@@ -79,6 +90,11 @@ tools() {
}
sha512sums="941357bdd5f947cdca41a1d31ae14b3fadc174ae5dce7b7981dbe58f61995f575ac2e97a7cc4fcc435184012017bec0920278263490464644f2cdfad9a6c5ddc tiff-4.0.7.tar.gz
+5f7a86b6dc1c9bcf707a1fc9fc4b79cc0cfa457582d13f89cc5db1d59193db468ecc8fe976fe688ae7bb6cb451759420cd0a00d957b7c614dbe8fc762adc9734 CVE-2016-10266.patch
+fccbf981daedff8e4f3b610dc86823cdb0b2f1e08be345b775bd5c7ba89ef681b3cd4e04a97832753081e9df07db0a68a0a0a38cb4f538f260c475565c204f8b CVE-2016-10267.patch
+57cd4f9aadaedac5f43d8085729ca5871a40c5bfc88fe01ec9db94162067fb9290ead0d5fba0fef1f6efc04fe2ec18a21703a314c0732be86ddfcca5275803c1 CVE-2016-10268.patch
+3a807132bf751b9e3c0e5a014b6cd9c9b98f79581b2d70167af3e29797a204fe2977349052042757f9bc634faa1afbec01462a947c739fb1ee9b7249341e4879 CVE-2016-10269.patch
+1db4890259028c1c29c15137e743e376e1044475b1a3bbdeb946a1b54708a85422217228aed5f5c8ddf2cf156ec75264b430d1d3aa3539b805809d69522f84b5 CVE-2016-10270.patch
001a2df978f51025771c243edee2d033c91114bdd5318a05730b910add9c70f219a848faad899f27421ca18da6ce9972013aa3ecf689cf4ea37ac5409b4b6244 CVE-2017-5225.patch
c2401f41ce4725b94159da25290270fe4029bacd934aec4d85b4468b4ee8b37fffd4f07eb12ed654863c3ad97474cd4c196db0a3a0ccf6497fc4d8e6d46a5961 CVE-2017-7592.patch
487de0b6a4cf7f09bf23b8217ec8dbac3640f7e47cd86e885f331bc41e385146fd73c6e079768952adb6fa12148b9e52a177bf67affdfe8bdf3d8205302a3f0c CVE-2017-7593.patch
diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10266.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10266.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..554f5ea8c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10266.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 438274f938e046d33cb0e1230b41da32ffe223e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 21:56:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow
+ in TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero. Reported
+ by Agostino Sarubbo. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_read.c | 2 +-
+ libtiff/tiffiop.h | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_read.c b/libtiff/tif_read.c
+index c26c55f4..52bbf507 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_read.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_read.c
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ TIFFReadEncodedStrip(TIFF* tif, uint32 strip, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
+ rowsperstrip=td->td_rowsperstrip;
+ if (rowsperstrip>td->td_imagelength)
+ rowsperstrip=td->td_imagelength;
+- stripsperplane=((td->td_imagelength+rowsperstrip-1)/rowsperstrip);
++ stripsperplane= TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip);
+ stripinplane=(strip%stripsperplane);
+ plane=(uint16)(strip/stripsperplane);
+ rows=td->td_imagelength-stripinplane*rowsperstrip;
+diff --git a/libtiff/tiffiop.h b/libtiff/tiffiop.h
+index ffbb647b..cb59460a 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tiffiop.h
++++ b/libtiff/tiffiop.h
+@@ -250,6 +250,10 @@ struct tiff {
+ #define TIFFhowmany_32(x, y) (((uint32)x < (0xffffffff - (uint32)(y-1))) ? \
+ ((((uint32)(x))+(((uint32)(y))-1))/((uint32)(y))) : \
+ 0U)
++/* Variant of TIFFhowmany_32() that doesn't return 0 if x close to MAXUINT. */
++/* Caution: TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(x,y)*y might overflow */
++#define TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(x, y) \
++ (((uint32)(x) / (uint32)(y)) + ((((uint32)(x) % (uint32)(y)) != 0) ? 1 : 0))
+ #define TIFFhowmany8_32(x) (((x)&0x07)?((uint32)(x)>>3)+1:(uint32)(x)>>3)
+ #define TIFFroundup_32(x, y) (TIFFhowmany_32(x,y)*(y))
+ #define TIFFhowmany_64(x, y) ((((uint64)(x))+(((uint64)(y))-1))/((uint64)(y)))
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10267.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10267.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb4fee6a80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10267.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2016 11:15:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case
+ of failure in OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and
+ potential other issues. Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. Fixes
+ http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c b/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c
+index 1ccc3f9b..f19e8fd0 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c
+@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ typedef enum {
+
+ typedef struct {
+ TIFF* tif;
++ int decoder_ok;
+ #ifndef LIBJPEG_ENCAP_EXTERNAL
+ JMP_BUF exit_jmpbuf;
+ #endif
+@@ -722,6 +723,7 @@ OJPEGPreDecode(TIFF* tif, uint16 s)
+ }
+ sp->write_curstrile++;
+ }
++ sp->decoder_ok = 1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+@@ -784,8 +786,14 @@ OJPEGPreDecodeSkipScanlines(TIFF* tif)
+ static int
+ OJPEGDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
+ {
++ static const char module[]="OJPEGDecode";
+ OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
+ (void)s;
++ if( !sp->decoder_ok )
++ {
++ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Cannot decode: decoder not correctly initialized");
++ return 0;
++ }
+ if (sp->libjpeg_jpeg_query_style==0)
+ {
+ if (OJPEGDecodeRaw(tif,buf,cc)==0)
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10268.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10268.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce5f9be7a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10268.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 5397a417e61258c69209904e652a1f409ec3b9df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 22:13:32 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid uint32 underflow in cpDecodedStrips
+ that can cause various issues, such as buffer overflows in the library.
+ Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. Fixes
+ http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598
+
+---
+ ChangeLog | 7 +++++++
+ tools/tiffcp.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 668b66a..0f154d6 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
+ 2016-12-02 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>
+
++ * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid uint32 underflow in cpDecodedStrips that
++ can cause various issues, such as buffer overflows in the library.
++ Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
++ Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598
++
++2016-12-02 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com>
++
+ * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
+ TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
+ Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
+diff --git a/tools/tiffcp.c b/tools/tiffcp.c
+index a99c906..f294ed1 100644
+--- a/tools/tiffcp.c
++++ b/tools/tiffcp.c
+@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ DECLAREcpFunc(cpDecodedStrips)
+ tstrip_t s, ns = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
+ uint32 row = 0;
+ _TIFFmemset(buf, 0, stripsize);
+- for (s = 0; s < ns; s++) {
++ for (s = 0; s < ns && row < imagelength; s++) {
+ tsize_t cc = (row + rowsperstrip > imagelength) ?
+ TIFFVStripSize(in, imagelength - row) : stripsize;
+ if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(in, s, buf, cc) < 0
diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10269.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10269.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e672032360
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10269.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From 1044b43637fa7f70fb19b93593777b78bd20da86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 23:05:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based
+ buffer overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
+ ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample. The
+ fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind of issue of
+ PixarLog. Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. Fixes
+ http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_luv.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_luv.c b/libtiff/tif_luv.c
+index f68a9b13..e6783db5 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_luv.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_luv.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@
+ typedef struct logLuvState LogLuvState;
+
+ struct logLuvState {
++ int encoder_state; /* 1 if encoder correctly initialized */
+ int user_datafmt; /* user data format */
+ int encode_meth; /* encoding method */
+ int pixel_size; /* bytes per pixel */
+@@ -1552,6 +1553,7 @@ LogLuvSetupEncode(TIFF* tif)
+ td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL");
+ break;
+ }
++ sp->encoder_state = 1;
+ return (1);
+ notsupported:
+ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
+@@ -1563,19 +1565,27 @@ notsupported:
+ static void
+ LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif)
+ {
++ LogLuvState* sp = (LogLuvState*) tif->tif_data;
+ TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
+
++ assert(sp != 0);
+ /*
+ * For consistency, we always want to write out the same
+ * bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file,
+ * regardless of the data format being used by the application.
+ * Since this routine is called after tags have been set but
+ * before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here.
++ * Note: this is really a nasty approach. See PixarLogClose
+ */
+- td->td_samplesperpixel =
+- (td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
+- td->td_bitspersample = 16;
+- td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
++ if( sp->encoder_state )
++ {
++ /* See PixarLogClose. Might avoid issues with tags whose size depends
++ * on those below, but not completely sure this is enough. */
++ td->td_samplesperpixel =
++ (td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
++ td->td_bitspersample = 16;
++ td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
++ }
+ }
+
+ static void
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c b/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c
+index d1246c3d..aa99bc92 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c
+@@ -1233,8 +1233,10 @@ PixarLogPostEncode(TIFF* tif)
+ static void
+ PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
+ {
++ PixarLogState* sp = (PixarLogState*) tif->tif_data;
+ TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
+
++ assert(sp != 0);
+ /* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and
+ * troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against
+ * the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly
+@@ -1243,8 +1245,19 @@ PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif)
+ * readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set
+ * the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag.
+ */
+- td->td_bitspersample = 8;
+- td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
++
++ if (sp->state&PLSTATE_INIT) {
++ /* We test the state to avoid an issue such as in
++ * http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
++ * What appends in that case is that the bitspersample is 1 and
++ * a TransferFunction is set. The size of the TransferFunction
++ * depends on 1<<bitspersample. So if we increase it, an access
++ * out of the buffer will happen at directory flushing.
++ * Another option would be to clear those targs.
++ */
++ td->td_bitspersample = 8;
++ td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT;
++ }
+ }
+
+ static void
+--
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10270.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10270.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c419decca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/tiff/CVE-2016-10270.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 9a72a69e035ee70ff5c41541c8c61cd97990d018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2016 11:02:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify
+ ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to instanciate compute ntrips as
+ TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip), instead of a logic based on
+ the total size of data. Which is faulty is the total size of data is not
+ sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus results in reading outside of
+ the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when using TIFFReadScanline(). Reported
+ by Agostino Sarubbo. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
+
+* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
+for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
+the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
+
+---
+ libtiff/tif_dirread.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
+ libtiff/tif_strip.c | 9 ---------
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c
+index 3eec79c9..570d0c32 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c
+@@ -5502,8 +5502,7 @@ ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
+ uint64 rowblockbytes;
+ uint64 stripbytes;
+ uint32 strip;
+- uint64 nstrips64;
+- uint32 nstrips32;
++ uint32 nstrips;
+ uint32 rowsperstrip;
+ uint64* newcounts;
+ uint64* newoffsets;
+@@ -5534,18 +5533,17 @@ ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+- * never increase the number of strips in an image
++ * never increase the number of rows per strip
+ */
+ if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip)
+ return;
+- nstrips64 = TIFFhowmany_64(bytecount, stripbytes);
+- if ((nstrips64==0)||(nstrips64>0xFFFFFFFF)) /* something is wonky, do nothing. */
+- return;
+- nstrips32 = (uint32)nstrips64;
++ nstrips = TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip);
++ if( nstrips == 0 )
++ return;
+
+- newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
++ newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64),
+ "for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array");
+- newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
++ newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64),
+ "for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array");
+ if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) {
+ /*
+@@ -5562,18 +5560,18 @@ ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
+ * Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets
+ * that reflect the broken-up format.
+ */
+- for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips32; strip++) {
++ for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
+ if (stripbytes > bytecount)
+ stripbytes = bytecount;
+ newcounts[strip] = stripbytes;
+- newoffsets[strip] = offset;
++ newoffsets[strip] = stripbytes ? offset : 0;
+ offset += stripbytes;
+ bytecount -= stripbytes;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info.
+ */
+- td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips32;
++ td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips;
+ TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
+
+ _TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
+diff --git a/libtiff/tif_strip.c b/libtiff/tif_strip.c
+index 4c46ecf5..1676e47d 100644
+--- a/libtiff/tif_strip.c
++++ b/libtiff/tif_strip.c
+@@ -63,15 +63,6 @@ TIFFNumberOfStrips(TIFF* tif)
+ TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
+ uint32 nstrips;
+
+- /* If the value was already computed and store in td_nstrips, then return it,
+- since ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip might have altered and resized the
+- since the td_stripbytecount and td_stripoffset arrays to the new value
+- after the initial affectation of td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips() in
+- tif_dirread.c ~line 3612.
+- See http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 */
+- if( td->td_nstrips )
+- return td->td_nstrips;
+-
+ nstrips = (td->td_rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1 ? 1 :
+ TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_rowsperstrip));
+ if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE)
+--
+2.11.0
+
--
2.12.2
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