CVE-2018-7540 XSA-252
CVE-2018-7541 XSA-255
CVE-2018-7542 XSA-256
fixes #8613
---
main/xen/APKBUILD | 14 +++-
main/xen/xsa252.patch | 27 ++++++++
main/xen/xsa255-1.patch | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa255-2.patch | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa256.patch | 40 ++++++++++++
5 files changed, 380 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa252.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa255-1.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa255-2.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa256.patch
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD
index f48891c864..c2887566e1 100644
--- a/main/xen/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
pkgname=xen
pkgver=4.10.0
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor"
url="http://www.xen.org/"
arch="x86_64 armhf aarch64"
@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ options="!strip"
# - XSA-251
# - XSA-253
# - XSA-254
+# 4.10.0-r2:
+# - CVE-2018-7540 XSA-252
+# - CVE-2018-7541 XSA-255
+# - CVE-2018-7542 XSA-256
case "$CARCH" in
x86*)
@@ -155,8 +159,12 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/$pkgname/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgv
http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/zlib-$_ZLIB_VERSION.tar.gz
http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-$_IPXE_GIT_TAG.tar.gz
+ xsa252.patch
xsa253-4.10.patch
xsa254-4.10.patch
+ xsa255-1.patch
+ xsa255-2.patch
+ xsa256.patch
qemu-xen_paths.patch
@@ -416,8 +424,12 @@ c2bc9ffc8583aeae71cee9ddcc4418969768d4e3764d47307da54f93981c0109fb07d84b061b3a36
4928b5b82f57645be9408362706ff2c4d9baa635b21b0d41b1c82930e8c60a759b1ea4fa74d7e6c7cae1b7692d006aa5cb72df0c3b88bf049779aa2b566f9d35 tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz
021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
bbcce5e55040e7e29adebd4a5253a046016a6e2e7ff34cf801a42d147e1ec1af57e0297318249bfa9c5bbeac969fe4b37c18cbf845a80b2136d65387a4fc31da ipxe-git-356f6c1b64d7a97746d1816cef8ca22bdd8d0b5d.tar.gz
+63fd6cee56ef04506efd6bf632998dc90514ff967e9435514a5ba8d2c5781735f986241344a479b6f44df9c6e6a278a165ba14834b0b3236064e24f71cd600f1 xsa252.patch
58f288fb3087ecdd42075031b5604a493adef0754f68d596dce8576fbc46bfe8b1bf3dc429269cab3797b6f193036bdafeb32cf2c7cca34d9c89d5fe95a0453c xsa253-4.10.patch
f15350c0b44d3a6d5a3056dfac81d25f2af047135c528f6258f3d42ef26e6d87511d8e148a63e8d7d88108e07dc5b3551ed54c915be6dc3fe3f978ab72094321 xsa254-4.10.patch
+d16ead93486beee767c3c80d11981d940dfce55d9aabfe7adee480d02f575a2df074bb83a1e62e455ac754f6d8f3fb83abe7139b93b94b77233c2918b46dc2e2 xsa255-1.patch
+2f0719fbbde261a51e1ec66eb677fb2b17c94e0631d583c0a99357b7c2dfb2c695b6970ebbe8e05f68154344af74fa31e8b47b0d25c778b3aef1b284101ae528 xsa255-2.patch
+3bd2697a8ad66197264af8a713bf97152ed414c4b11910cc986c6adaa85bd86b4d35319675799edccf04aaff9ae48a58ca5c438cb6b5b95f60fffbfeec5e4faf xsa256.patch
1936ab39a1867957fa640eb81c4070214ca4856a2743ba7e49c0cd017917071a9680d015f002c57fa7b9600dbadd29dcea5887f50e6c133305df2669a7a933f3 qemu-xen_paths.patch
f095ea373f36381491ad36f0662fb4f53665031973721256b23166e596318581da7cbb0146d0beb2446729adfdb321e01468e377793f6563a67d68b8b0f7ffe3 hotplug-vif-vtrill.patch
77b08e9655e091b0352e4630d520b54c6ca6d659d1d38fbb4b3bfc9ff3e66db433a2e194ead32bb10ff962c382d800a670e82b7a62835b238e294b22808290ea musl-hvmloader-fix-stdint.patch
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa252.patch b/main/xen/xsa252.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8615928142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa252.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: memory: don't implicitly unpin for decrease-reservation
+
+It very likely was a mistake (copy-and-paste from domain cleanup code)
+to implicitly unpin here: The caller should really unpin itself before
+(or after, if they so wish) requesting the page to be removed.
+
+This is XSA-252.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -357,11 +357,6 @@ int guest_remove_page(struct domain *d,
+
+ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(gmfn), mfn, 0);
+
+-#ifdef _PGT_pinned
+- if ( !rc && test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_pinned, &page->u.inuse.type_info) )
+- put_page_and_type(page);
+-#endif
+-
+ /*
+ * With the lack of an IOMMU on some platforms, domains with DMA-capable
+ * device must retrieve the same pfn when the hypercall populate_physmap
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f8bba9e516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa255-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: gnttab/ARM: don't corrupt shared GFN array
+
+... by writing status GFNs to it. Introduce a second array instead.
+Also implement gnttab_status_gmfn() properly now that the information is
+suitably being tracked.
+
+While touching it anyway, remove a misguided (but luckily benign) upper
+bound check from gnttab_shared_gmfn(): We should never access beyond the
+bounds of that array.
+
+This is part of XSA-255.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+v3: Don't init the ARM GFN arrays to zero anymore, use INVALID_GFN.
+v2: New.
+
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -3775,6 +3775,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+ {
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct grant_table *gt = d->grant_table;
++ bool status = false;
+
+ grant_write_lock(gt);
+
+@@ -3785,6 +3786,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+ (idx & XENMAPIDX_grant_table_status) )
+ {
+ idx &= ~XENMAPIDX_grant_table_status;
++ status = true;
+ if ( idx < nr_status_frames(gt) )
+ *mfn = _mfn(virt_to_mfn(gt->status[idx]));
+ else
+@@ -3802,7 +3804,7 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+ }
+
+ if ( !rc )
+- gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn);
++ gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx, gfn);
+
+ grant_write_unlock(gt);
+
+--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
+@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
+ #define INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES 1U
+
+ struct grant_table_arch {
+- gfn_t *gfn;
++ gfn_t *shared_gfn;
++ gfn_t *status_gfn;
+ };
+
+ void gnttab_clear_flag(unsigned long nr, uint16_t *addr);
+@@ -21,7 +22,6 @@ int replace_grant_host_mapping(unsigned
+ unsigned long new_gpaddr, unsigned int flags);
+ void gnttab_mark_dirty(struct domain *d, unsigned long l);
+ #define gnttab_create_status_page(d, t, i) do {} while (0)
+-#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i) (0)
+ #define gnttab_release_host_mappings(domain) 1
+ static inline int replace_grant_supported(void)
+ {
+@@ -42,19 +42,35 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+
+ #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) \
+ ({ \
+- (gt)->arch.gfn = xzalloc_array(gfn_t, (gt)->max_grant_frames); \
+- ( (gt)->arch.gfn ? 0 : -ENOMEM ); \
++ unsigned int ngf_ = (gt)->max_grant_frames; \
++ unsigned int nsf_ = grant_to_status_frames(ngf_); \
++ \
++ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, ngf_); \
++ (gt)->arch.status_gfn = xmalloc_array(gfn_t, nsf_); \
++ if ( (gt)->arch.shared_gfn && (gt)->arch.status_gfn ) \
++ { \
++ while ( ngf_-- ) \
++ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn[ngf_] = INVALID_GFN; \
++ while ( nsf_-- ) \
++ (gt)->arch.status_gfn[nsf_] = INVALID_GFN; \
++ } \
++ else \
++ gnttab_destroy_arch(gt); \
++ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn ? 0 : -ENOMEM; \
+ })
+
+ #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) \
+ do { \
+- xfree((gt)->arch.gfn); \
+- (gt)->arch.gfn = NULL; \
++ xfree((gt)->arch.shared_gfn); \
++ (gt)->arch.shared_gfn = NULL; \
++ xfree((gt)->arch.status_gfn); \
++ (gt)->arch.status_gfn = NULL; \
+ } while ( 0 )
+
+-#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn) \
++#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) \
+ do { \
+- (gt)->arch.gfn[idx] = gfn; \
++ ((st) ? (gt)->arch.status_gfn : (gt)->arch.shared_gfn)[idx] = \
++ (gfn); \
+ } while ( 0 )
+
+ #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
+@@ -65,8 +81,10 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+ } while ( 0 )
+
+ #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i) \
+- ( ((i >= nr_grant_frames(t)) && \
+- (i < (t)->max_grant_frames))? 0 : gfn_x((t)->arch.gfn[i]))
++ gfn_x(((i) >= nr_grant_frames(t)) ? INVALID_GFN : (t)->arch.shared_gfn[i])
++
++#define gnttab_status_gmfn(d, t, i) \
++ gfn_x(((i) >= nr_status_frames(t)) ? INVALID_GFN : (t)->arch.status_gfn[i])
+
+ #define gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(d) \
+ (is_domain_direct_mapped(d) && need_iommu(d))
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+
+ #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) 0
+ #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) do {} while ( 0 )
+-#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
++#define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
+
+ #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
+ do { \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..402b6efe98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa255-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: gnttab: don't blindly free status pages upon version change
+
+There may still be active mappings, which would trigger the respective
+BUG_ON(). Split the loop into one dealing with the page attributes and
+the second (when the first fully passed) freeing the pages. Return an
+error if any pages still have pending references.
+
+This is part of XSA-255.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+v4: Add gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, ...) to domain_crash() invocations.
+v3: Call guest_physmap_remove_page() from gnttab_map_frame(), making the
+ code unconditional at the same time. Re-base over changes to first
+ patch.
+v2: Also deal with translated guests.
+
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1636,23 +1636,74 @@ status_alloc_failed:
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+-static void
++static int
+ gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
+ {
+- int i;
++ unsigned int i;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
+ {
+ struct page_info *pg = virt_to_page(gt->status[i]);
++ gfn_t gfn = gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, true, i);
++
++ /*
++ * For translated domains, recovering from failure after partial
++ * changes were made is more complicated than it seems worth
++ * implementing at this time. Hence respective error paths below
++ * crash the domain in such a case.
++ */
++ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
++ {
++ int rc = gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN)
++ ? 0
++ : guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gfn,
++ _mfn(page_to_mfn(pg)), 0);
++
++ if ( rc )
++ {
++ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
++ "Could not remove status frame %u (GFN %#lx) from P2M\n",
++ i, gfn_x(gfn));
++ domain_crash(d);
++ return rc;
++ }
++ gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, true, i, INVALID_GFN);
++ }
+
+ BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d);
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
+ put_page(pg);
+- BUG_ON(pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap);
++
++ if ( pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap )
++ {
++ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
++ {
++ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,
++ "Wrong page state %#lx of status frame %u (GFN %#lx)\n",
++ pg->count_info, i, gfn_x(gfn));
++ domain_crash(d);
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ if ( get_page(pg, d) )
++ set_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info);
++ while ( i-- )
++ gnttab_create_status_page(d, gt, i);
++ }
++ return -EBUSY;
++ }
++
++ page_set_owner(pg, NULL);
++ }
++
++ for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
++ {
+ free_xenheap_page(gt->status[i]);
+ gt->status[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ gt->nr_status_frames = 0;
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -2962,8 +3013,9 @@ gnttab_set_version(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARA
+ break;
+ }
+
+- if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 )
+- gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt);
++ if ( op.version < 2 && gt->gt_version == 2 &&
++ (res = gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(currd, gt)) != 0 )
++ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Make sure there's no crud left over from the old version. */
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_grant_frames(gt); i++ )
+@@ -3803,6 +3855,11 @@ int gnttab_map_frame(struct domain *d, u
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
++ if ( !rc && paging_mode_translate(d) &&
++ !gfn_eq(gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx), INVALID_GFN) )
++ rc = guest_physmap_remove_page(d, gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx),
++ *mfn, 0);
++
+ if ( !rc )
+ gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, status, idx, gfn);
+
+--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/grant_table.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+ (gfn); \
+ } while ( 0 )
+
++#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx) ({ \
++ _gfn((st) ? gnttab_status_gmfn(NULL, gt, idx) \
++ : gnttab_shared_gmfn(NULL, gt, idx)); \
++})
++
+ #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
+ do { \
+ share_xen_page_with_guest( \
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/grant_table.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+ #define gnttab_init_arch(gt) 0
+ #define gnttab_destroy_arch(gt) do {} while ( 0 )
+ #define gnttab_set_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx, gfn) do {} while ( 0 )
++#define gnttab_get_frame_gfn(gt, st, idx) ({ \
++ unsigned long mfn_ = (st) ? gnttab_status_mfn(gt, idx) \
++ : gnttab_shared_mfn(gt, idx); \
++ unsigned long gpfn_ = get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_); \
++ VALID_M2P(gpfn_) ? _gfn(gpfn_) : INVALID_GFN; \
++})
+
+ #define gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i) \
+ do { \
+@@ -63,11 +69,11 @@ static inline unsigned int gnttab_dom0_m
+ } while ( 0 )
+
+
+-#define gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i) \
++#define gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i) \
+ ((virt_to_maddr((t)->shared_raw[i]) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+
+ #define gnttab_shared_gmfn(d, t, i) \
+- (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(d, t, i)))
++ (mfn_to_gmfn(d, gnttab_shared_mfn(t, i)))
+
+
+ #define gnttab_status_mfn(t, i) \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa256.patch b/main/xen/xsa256.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50ff24e17b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa256.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Subject: x86/hvm: Disallow the creation of HVM domains without Local APIC emulation
+
+There are multiple problems, not necesserily limited to:
+
+ * Guests which configure event channels via hvmop_set_evtchn_upcall_vector(),
+ or which hit %cr8 emulation will cause Xen to fall over a NULL vlapic->regs
+ pointer.
+
+ * On Intel hardware, disabling the TPR_SHADOW execution control without
+ reenabling CR8_{LOAD,STORE} interception means that the guests %cr8
+ accesses interact with the real TPR. Amongst other things, setting the
+ real TPR to 0xf blocks even IPIs from interrupting this CPU.
+
+ * On hardware which sets up the use of Interrupt Posting, including
+ IOMMU-Posting, guests run without the appropriate non-root configuration,
+ which at a minimum will result in dropped interrupts.
+
+Whether no-LAPIC mode is of any use at all remains to be seen.
+
+This is XSA-256.
+
+Reported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+index f93327b..f65fc12 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static bool emulation_flags_ok(const struct domain *d, uint32_t emflags)
+ if ( is_hardware_domain(d) &&
+ emflags != (XEN_X86_EMU_LAPIC|XEN_X86_EMU_IOAPIC) )
+ return false;
+- if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) && emflags &&
++ if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) &&
+ emflags != XEN_X86_EMU_ALL && emflags != XEN_X86_EMU_LAPIC )
+ return false;
+ }
--
2.16.2
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