CVE-2015-7545
---
main/git/APKBUILD | 29 ++-
main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch | 427 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch | 100 +++++++++
main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch | 101 +++++++++
main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch | 135 ++++++++++++
main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch | 57 +++++
6 files changed, 845 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
create mode 100644 main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
create mode 100644 main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
create mode 100644 main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
create mode 100644 main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch
diff --git a/main/git/APKBUILD b/main/git/APKBUILD
index 37299ed..2fec308 100644
--- a/main/git/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/git/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
+# Contributor: Sergey Lukin <sergej.lukin@gmail.com>
pkgname=git
pkgver=2.2.1
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A distributed version control system"
url="http://git.or.cz/"
arch="all"
@@ -31,6 +32,11 @@ source="git-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/git/git/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz
bb-tar.patch
git-daemon.initd
git-daemon.confd
+ CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
+ CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
+ CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
+ CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
+ CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch
"
_makeopts="
@@ -203,12 +209,27 @@ _git_perl() {
md5sums="d1110e35369bc37aa204915f64c5d1c8 git-2.2.1.tar.gz
e63a201556c4f089de790805c09a2e5b bb-tar.patch
53546650670c0ab8858e91474e5ffee9 git-daemon.initd
-2258e95d389ccc6de0b5111d53d9eed6 git-daemon.confd"
+2258e95d389ccc6de0b5111d53d9eed6 git-daemon.confd
+33f105ea489d55f9cece57deed8a27bd CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
+2e666466fb83c3b9af065142d410408f CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
+08199293b22e258492f3f35ff1245c22 CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
+84af0023dff4e7f5cbd9da708a296e90 CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
+0c8c2b7f681c335d405aeedf9f8401e6 CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch"
sha256sums="aca76e204d2ad3ea783f5309261dc5fcadbd7a996afd841bdb7bf4a29658c067 git-2.2.1.tar.gz
cb6319f47d81605e199771350154cbed0a6e85ef9042a689f2b405c64039f49c bb-tar.patch
817cd58dcb9a5ff32759d2132bb805a5dd34ad6fa0b0a5cbe4ab8786f3b7c0d9 git-daemon.initd
-aaa80bd059db549dadf4c4e27a9aa41a4b5def844f8e563c493bc8513dcd981e git-daemon.confd"
+aaa80bd059db549dadf4c4e27a9aa41a4b5def844f8e563c493bc8513dcd981e git-daemon.confd
+aeae9d25df30a59e15f30c6047bb627de120cab1c724558140941514ae782229 CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
+d34690d72179773a6b1769ea3a85ab91d17e7ba6f38abec683d911c598dd12fb CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
+ab5a8070e6c47bb6d7d553c3f7f12e864490b6cd139b2e03e04b9cffac7bd358 CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
+cf75d74b185fa2bf5bcfd33764ea6cd6ec66a072182def4d34493a4a4b69d1ed CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
+2f23f815b4508edf1f39293de31b2874b1702fe79f3b45954bd2125b9fb2131a CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch"
sha512sums="b723dff750b8fad34b7268158c74f17a403ebc4358944b0c2986922090366e87840d6d3bd14b4574f63157acd1b69799715fbbe7decd70fa4edc18b1584a8ae8 git-2.2.1.tar.gz
6fa088a753c2a697e8dbef2032ed63e8c2a0553a41cff2fcff893c2f35c51d2c697054cc921c23ee606f77b93d0f340df85220b15e1c470bd352f7fba3986cd0 bb-tar.patch
47f35d1553408236502f936d0ce5dbc6c44b6593ad5ef9ddebbfd8dbca5f968c21452df7053ac271445830d36a147a7124e2ea1cf9fb98340d975fdb0346011a git-daemon.initd
-9640f8078d68ed2678e5249da3f946fc21f50e858b94127a4221de73c6132101afcd46bc1fe33861e9a7f731c0dc9591915b8ebf376b8e690cd7135703966509 git-daemon.confd"
+9640f8078d68ed2678e5249da3f946fc21f50e858b94127a4221de73c6132101afcd46bc1fe33861e9a7f731c0dc9591915b8ebf376b8e690cd7135703966509 git-daemon.confd
+f1db673f02a685cc27c8272bf5debe912e1a46fce49196f946df84678f778939f5789c6964c9fb74f2f604ebf8f51a3b9e859a6e26818110febef4413697b8c0 CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
+ec985321aa9aa7bc157f965f2f40c622855578c6e25fa7f05cf1e865820b22b6a159751c1cf8591226a3de35476d1df0275ae468d93e0c6d3db2447f4820f2ed CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
+8a0b6ee85c33fc6012afd4b7677f698423ddf7a4e97c0008af288d716bc884f28f057e7ea000e548311699a779b7b84c3c6ab792f9f8ebc91c99d01691b25cde CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
+07d474f08dd338a7a36dff84274973f49350724d422aa3e5f2cb192a4d6bbd942176567623580a8dcfc309a3c656f6838303fd6aae0820173ee989c98114904e CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
+feb4be2594cca6a9fc34633fca75389bfbf6230e22d697b54c2c02d24586407d717b9173ad5942d3e9652c7c3dc14c3d6cf08d33ed26d0e94cd46c06bd28be96 CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch"
diff --git a/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4cf9483
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+commit a5adaced2e13c135d5d9cc65be9eb95aa3bacedf
+Author: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Wed Sep 16 13:12:52 2015 -0400
+
+ transport: add a protocol-whitelist environment variable
+
+ If we are cloning an untrusted remote repository into a
+ sandbox, we may also want to fetch remote submodules in
+ order to get the complete view as intended by the other
+ side. However, that opens us up to attacks where a malicious
+ user gets us to clone something they would not otherwise
+ have access to (this is not necessarily a problem by itself,
+ but we may then act on the cloned contents in a way that
+ exposes them to the attacker).
+
+ Ideally such a setup would sandbox git entirely away from
+ high-value items, but this is not always practical or easy
+ to set up (e.g., OS network controls may block multiple
+ protocols, and we would want to enable some but not others).
+
+ We can help this case by providing a way to restrict
+ particular protocols. We use a whitelist in the environment.
+ This is more annoying to set up than a blacklist, but
+ defaults to safety if the set of protocols git supports
+ grows). If no whitelist is specified, we continue to default
+ to allowing all protocols (this is an "unsafe" default, but
+ since the minority of users will want this sandboxing
+ effect, it is the only sensible one).
+
+ A note on the tests: ideally these would all be in a single
+ test file, but the git-daemon and httpd test infrastructure
+ is an all-or-nothing proposition rather than a test-by-test
+ prerequisite. By putting them all together, we would be
+ unable to test the file-local code on machines without
+ apache.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+ Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/git.txt b/Documentation/git.txt
+index a62ed6f..b6a12b3 100644
+--- a/Documentation/git.txt
++++ b/Documentation/git.txt
+@@ -1045,6 +1045,38 @@ GIT_ICASE_PATHSPECS::
+ an operation has touched every ref (e.g., because you are
+ cloning a repository to make a backup).
+
++`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`::
++ If set, provide a colon-separated list of protocols which are
++ allowed to be used with fetch/push/clone. This is useful to
++ restrict recursive submodule initialization from an untrusted
++ repository. Any protocol not mentioned will be disallowed (i.e.,
++ this is a whitelist, not a blacklist). If the variable is not
++ set at all, all protocols are enabled. The protocol names
++ currently used by git are:
++
++ - `file`: any local file-based path (including `file://` URLs,
++ or local paths)
++
++ - `git`: the anonymous git protocol over a direct TCP
++ connection (or proxy, if configured)
++
++ - `ssh`: git over ssh (including `host:path` syntax,
++ `git+ssh://`, etc).
++
++ - `rsync`: git over rsync
++
++ - `http`: git over http, both "smart http" and "dumb http".
++ Note that this does _not_ include `https`; if you want both,
++ you should specify both as `http:https`.
++
++ - any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
++ `hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
++Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
++If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
++redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
++restrict this.
++
+
+ Discussion[[Discussion]]
+ ------------------------
+diff --git a/connect.c b/connect.c
+index 14c924b..bd4b50e 100644
+--- a/connect.c
++++ b/connect.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include "url.h"
+ #include "string-list.h"
+ #include "sha1-array.h"
++#include "transport.h"
+
+ static char *server_capabilities;
+ static const char *parse_feature_value(const char *, const char *, int *);
+@@ -694,6 +695,9 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ * cannot connect.
+ */
+ char *target_host = xstrdup(hostandport);
++
++ transport_check_allowed("git");
++
+ if (git_use_proxy(hostandport))
+ conn = git_proxy_connect(fd, hostandport);
+ else
+@@ -727,6 +730,7 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ int putty;
+ char *ssh_host = hostandport;
+ const char *port = NULL;
++ transport_check_allowed("ssh");
+ get_host_and_port(&ssh_host, &port);
+
+ if (!port)
+@@ -768,6 +772,7 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
+ /* remove repo-local variables from the environment */
+ conn->env = local_repo_env;
+ conn->use_shell = 1;
++ transport_check_allowed("file");
+ }
+ argv_array_push(&conn->args, cmd.buf);
+
+diff --git a/t/lib-proto-disable.sh b/t/lib-proto-disable.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b0917d9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/lib-proto-disable.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++# Test routines for checking protocol disabling.
++
++# test cloning a particular protocol
++# $1 - description of the protocol
++# $2 - machine-readable name of the protocol
++# $3 - the URL to try cloning
++test_proto () {
++ desc=$1
++ proto=$2
++ url=$3
++
++ test_expect_success "clone $1 (enabled)" '
++ rm -rf tmp.git &&
++ (
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
++ )
++ '
++
++ test_expect_success "fetch $1 (enabled)" '
++ (
++ cd tmp.git &&
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ git fetch
++ )
++ '
++
++ test_expect_success "push $1 (enabled)" '
++ (
++ cd tmp.git &&
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=$proto &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ git push origin HEAD:pushed
++ )
++ '
++
++ test_expect_success "push $1 (disabled)" '
++ (
++ cd tmp.git &&
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ test_must_fail git push origin HEAD:pushed
++ )
++ '
++
++ test_expect_success "fetch $1 (disabled)" '
++ (
++ cd tmp.git &&
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ test_must_fail git fetch
++ )
++ '
++
++ test_expect_success "clone $1 (disabled)" '
++ rm -rf tmp.git &&
++ (
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none &&
++ export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL &&
++ test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
++ )
++ '
++}
++
++# set up an ssh wrapper that will access $host/$repo in the
++# trash directory, and enable it for subsequent tests.
++setup_ssh_wrapper () {
++ test_expect_success 'setup ssh wrapper' '
++ write_script ssh-wrapper <<-\EOF &&
++ echo >&2 "ssh: $*"
++ host=$1; shift
++ cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/$host" &&
++ eval "$*"
++ EOF
++ GIT_SSH="$PWD/ssh-wrapper" &&
++ export GIT_SSH &&
++ export TRASH_DIRECTORY
++ '
++}
++
++# set up a wrapper that can be used with remote-ext to
++# access repositories in the "remote" directory of trash-dir,
++# like "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git"
++setup_ext_wrapper () {
++ test_expect_success 'setup ext wrapper' '
++ write_script fake-remote <<-\EOF &&
++ echo >&2 "fake-remote: $*"
++ cd "$TRASH_DIRECTORY/remote" &&
++ eval "$*"
++ EOF
++ PATH=$TRASH_DIRECTORY:$PATH &&
++ export TRASH_DIRECTORY
++ '
++}
+diff --git a/t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh b/t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..563592d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5810-proto-disable-local.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test disabling of local paths in clone/fetch'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
++ test_commit one
++'
++
++test_proto "file://" file "file://$PWD"
++test_proto "path" file .
++
++test_done
+diff --git a/t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh b/t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..8ac6b2a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5811-proto-disable-git.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test disabling of git-over-tcp in clone/fetch'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-git-daemon.sh"
++start_git_daemon
++
++test_expect_success 'create git-accessible repo' '
++ bare="$GIT_DAEMON_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/repo.git" &&
++ test_commit one &&
++ git --bare init "$bare" &&
++ git push "$bare" HEAD &&
++ >"$bare/git-daemon-export-ok" &&
++ git -C "$bare" config daemon.receivepack true
++'
++
++test_proto "git://" git "$GIT_DAEMON_URL/repo.git"
++
++test_done
+diff --git a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..dd5001c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test disabling of git-over-http in clone/fetch'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh"
++start_httpd
++
++test_expect_success 'create git-accessible repo' '
++ bare="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/repo.git" &&
++ test_commit one &&
++ git --bare init "$bare" &&
++ git push "$bare" HEAD &&
++ git -C "$bare" config http.receivepack true
++'
++
++test_proto "smart http" http "$HTTPD_URL/smart/repo.git"
++
++stop_httpd
++test_done
+diff --git a/t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh b/t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..ad877d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5813-proto-disable-ssh.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test disabling of git-over-ssh in clone/fetch'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
++
++setup_ssh_wrapper
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
++ test_commit one &&
++ mkdir remote &&
++ git init --bare remote/repo.git &&
++ git push remote/repo.git HEAD
++'
++
++test_proto "host:path" ssh "remote:repo.git"
++test_proto "ssh://" ssh "ssh://remote/$PWD/remote/repo.git"
++test_proto "git+ssh://" ssh "git+ssh://remote/$PWD/remote/repo.git"
++
++test_done
+diff --git a/t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh b/t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..9d6f7df
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5814-proto-disable-ext.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test disabling of remote-helper paths in clone/fetch'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-proto-disable.sh"
++
++setup_ext_wrapper
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
++ test_commit one &&
++ mkdir remote &&
++ git init --bare remote/repo.git &&
++ git push remote/repo.git HEAD
++'
++
++test_proto "remote-helper" ext "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git"
++
++test_done
+diff --git a/transport-helper.c b/transport-helper.c
+index 7dc4a44..0b5362c 100644
+--- a/transport-helper.c
++++ b/transport-helper.c
+@@ -1038,6 +1038,8 @@ int transport_helper_init(struct transport *transport, const char *name)
+ struct helper_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
+ data->name = name;
+
++ transport_check_allowed(name);
++
+ if (getenv("GIT_TRANSPORT_HELPER_DEBUG"))
+ debug = 1;
+
+diff --git a/transport.c b/transport.c
+index 88bde1d..94fe865 100644
+--- a/transport.c
++++ b/transport.c
+@@ -909,6 +909,20 @@ static int external_specification_len(const char *url)
+ return strchr(url, ':') - url;
+ }
+
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++ struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
++ const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++
++ if (!v)
++ return;
++
++ string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
++ if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
++ die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
++ string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
++}
++
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ {
+ const char *helper;
+@@ -940,12 +954,14 @@ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ if (helper) {
+ transport_helper_init(ret, helper);
+ } else if (starts_with(url, "rsync:")) {
++ transport_check_allowed("rsync");
+ ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_via_rsync;
+ ret->fetch = fetch_objs_via_rsync;
+ ret->push = rsync_transport_push;
+ ret->smart_options = NULL;
+ } else if (url_is_local_not_ssh(url) && is_file(url) && is_bundle(url, 1)) {
+ struct bundle_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
++ transport_check_allowed("file");
+ ret->data = data;
+ ret->get_refs_list = get_refs_from_bundle;
+ ret->fetch = fetch_refs_from_bundle;
+@@ -957,7 +973,10 @@ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+ || starts_with(url, "ssh://")
+ || starts_with(url, "git+ssh://")
+ || starts_with(url, "ssh+git://")) {
+- /* These are builtin smart transports. */
++ /*
++ * These are builtin smart transports; "allowed" transports
++ * will be checked individually in git_connect.
++ */
+ struct git_transport_data *data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*data));
+ ret->data = data;
+ ret->set_option = NULL;
+diff --git a/transport.h b/transport.h
+index 3e0091e..f7df6ec 100644
+--- a/transport.h
++++ b/transport.h
+@@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ struct transport {
+ /* Returns a transport suitable for the url */
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
+
++/*
++ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
++ * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
++ * as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ */
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
++
+ /* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
+
+ /* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */
diff --git a/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a6be12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+commit 33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021
+Author: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Wed Sep 16 13:13:12 2015 -0400
+
+ submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule fetches
+
+ Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary
+ code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come
+ from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote
+ repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a
+ known-good subset of protocols.
+
+ Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule
+ commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not.
+ This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in
+ the tests we run:
+
+ git submodule add ext::...
+
+ which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the
+ command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is
+ simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a
+ case. And since such protocols should be an exception
+ (especially because nobody who clones from them will be able
+ to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience
+ anyone in practice.
+
+ Reported-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+ Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
+index 36797c3..78c2740 100755
+--- a/git-submodule.sh
++++ b/git-submodule.sh
+@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ require_work_tree
+ wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
+ cd_to_toplevel
+
++# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
++# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
++# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
++#
++# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
++# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
++: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
++export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
++
+ command=
+ branch=
+ force=
+diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..06f55a1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
++. ./test-lib.sh
++. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
++
++setup_ext_wrapper
++setup_ssh_wrapper
++
++test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
++ mkdir remote &&
++ git init remote/repo.git &&
++ (cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
++ # submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
++ # but its implementation is overly conservative.
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
++ git commit -m "add submodules"
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
++ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
++ rm -rf dst &&
++ git clone . dst &&
++ git -C dst submodule init
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
++ git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
++ test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
++ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
++'
++
++test_done
diff --git a/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2df1fdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+commit 5088d3b38775f8ac12d7f77636775b16059b67ef
+Author: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Tue Sep 22 18:03:49 2015 -0400
+
+ transport: refactor protocol whitelist code
+
+ The current callers only want to die when their transport is
+ prohibited. But future callers want to query the mechanism
+ without dying.
+
+ Let's break out a few query functions, and also save the
+ results in a static list so we don't have to re-parse for
+ each query.
+
+ Based-on-a-patch-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+ Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+diff --git a/transport.c b/transport.c
+index 94fe865..647d2c2 100644
+--- a/transport.c
++++ b/transport.c
+@@ -909,18 +909,40 @@ static int external_specification_len(const char *url)
+ return strchr(url, ':') - url;
+ }
+
+-void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++static const struct string_list *protocol_whitelist(void)
+ {
+- struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
+- const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++ static int enabled = -1;
++ static struct string_list allowed = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
++
++ if (enabled < 0) {
++ const char *v = getenv("GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL");
++ if (v) {
++ string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
++ sort_string_list(&allowed);
++ enabled = 1;
++ } else {
++ enabled = 0;
++ }
++ }
+
+- if (!v)
+- return;
++ return enabled ? &allowed : NULL;
++}
++
++int is_transport_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++ const struct string_list *allowed = protocol_whitelist();
++ return !allowed || string_list_has_string(allowed, type);
++}
+
+- string_list_split(&allowed, v, ':', -1);
+- if (!unsorted_string_list_has_string(&allowed, type))
++void transport_check_allowed(const char *type)
++{
++ if (!is_transport_allowed(type))
+ die("transport '%s' not allowed", type);
+- string_list_clear(&allowed, 0);
++}
++
++int transport_restrict_protocols(void)
++{
++ return !!protocol_whitelist();
+ }
+
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *remote, const char *url)
+diff --git a/transport.h b/transport.h
+index f7df6ec..ed84da2 100644
+--- a/transport.h
++++ b/transport.h
+@@ -133,12 +133,23 @@ struct transport {
+ struct transport *transport_get(struct remote *, const char *);
+
+ /*
++ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment. Type should
++ * generally be the URL scheme, as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ */
++int is_transport_allowed(const char *type);
++
++/*
+ * Check whether a transport is allowed by the environment,
+- * and die otherwise. type should generally be the URL scheme,
+- * as described in Documentation/git.txt
++ * and die otherwise.
+ */
+ void transport_check_allowed(const char *type);
+
++/*
++ * Returns true if the user has attempted to turn on protocol
++ * restrictions at all.
++ */
++int transport_restrict_protocols(void);
++
+ /* Transport options which apply to git:// and scp-style URLs */
+
+ /* The program to use on the remote side to send a pack */
diff --git a/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e76516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+commit f4113cac0c88b4f36ee6f3abf3218034440a68e3
+Author: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+Date: Tue Sep 22 18:06:04 2015 -0400
+
+ http: limit redirection to protocol-whitelist
+
+ Previously, libcurl would follow redirection to any protocol
+ it was compiled for support with. This is desirable to allow
+ redirection from HTTP to HTTPS. However, it would even
+ successfully allow redirection from HTTP to SFTP, a protocol
+ that git does not otherwise support at all. Furthermore
+ git's new protocol-whitelisting could be bypassed by
+ following a redirect within the remote helper, as it was
+ only enforced at transport selection time.
+
+ This patch limits redirects within libcurl to HTTP, HTTPS,
+ FTP and FTPS. If there is a protocol-whitelist present, this
+ list is limited to those also allowed by the whitelist. As
+ redirection happens from within libcurl, it is impossible
+ for an HTTP redirect to a protocol implemented within
+ another remote helper.
+
+ When the curl version git was compiled with is too old to
+ support restrictions on protocol redirection, we warn the
+ user if GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL restrictions were requested. This
+ is a little inaccurate, as even without that variable in the
+ environment, we would still restrict SFTP, etc, and we do
+ not warn in that case. But anything else means we would
+ literally warn every time git accesses an http remote.
+
+ This commit includes a test, but it is not as robust as we
+ would hope. It redirects an http request to ftp, and checks
+ that curl complained about the protocol, which means that we
+ are relying on curl's specific error message to know what
+ happened. Ideally we would redirect to a working ftp server
+ and confirm that we can clone without protocol restrictions,
+ and not with them. But we do not have a portable way of
+ providing an ftp server, nor any other protocol that curl
+ supports (https is the closest, but we would have to deal
+ with certificates).
+
+ [jk: added test and version warning]
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+ Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/git.txt b/Documentation/git.txt
+index b6a12b3..41a09ca 100644
+--- a/Documentation/git.txt
++++ b/Documentation/git.txt
+@@ -1071,11 +1071,6 @@ GIT_ICASE_PATHSPECS::
+
+ - any external helpers are named by their protocol (e.g., use
+ `hg` to allow the `git-remote-hg` helper)
+-+
+-Note that this controls only git's internal protocol selection.
+-If libcurl is used (e.g., by the `http` transport), it may
+-redirect to other protocols. There is not currently any way to
+-restrict this.
+
+
+ Discussion[[Discussion]]
+diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
+index 6798620..5a57bcc 100644
+--- a/http.c
++++ b/http.c
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #include "credential.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "pkt-line.h"
++#include "transport.h"
+
+ int active_requests;
+ int http_is_verbose;
+@@ -303,6 +304,7 @@ static void set_curl_keepalive(CURL *c)
+ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ {
+ CURL *result = curl_easy_init();
++ long allowed_protocols = 0;
+
+ if (!result)
+ die("curl_easy_init failed");
+@@ -355,6 +357,21 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ #elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POST301, 1);
+ #endif
++#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071304
++ if (is_transport_allowed("http"))
++ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTP;
++ if (is_transport_allowed("https"))
++ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_HTTPS;
++ if (is_transport_allowed("ftp"))
++ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTP;
++ if (is_transport_allowed("ftps"))
++ allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTPS;
++ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, allowed_protocols);
++#else
++ if (transport_restrict_protocols())
++ warning("protocol restrictions not applied to curl redirects because\n"
++ "your curl version is too old (>= 7.19.4)");
++#endif
+
+ if (getenv("GIT_CURL_VERBOSE"))
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1);
+diff --git a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+index 0b81a00..68ef8ad 100644
+--- a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
++++ b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-perm/(.*)$ /smart/$1 [R=301]
+ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-temp/(.*)$ /smart/$1 [R=302]
+ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-auth/(.*)$ /auth/smart/$1 [R=301]
+ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-limited/(.*)/info/refs$ /smart/$1/info/refs [R=301]
++RewriteRule ^/ftp-redir/(.*)$ ftp://localhost:1000/$1 [R=302]
+
+ <IfDefine SSL>
+ LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so
+diff --git a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+index dd5001c..6a4f816 100755
+--- a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
++++ b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+@@ -16,5 +16,14 @@ test_expect_success 'create git-accessible repo' '
+
+ test_proto "smart http" http "$HTTPD_URL/smart/repo.git"
+
++test_expect_success 'curl redirects respect whitelist' '
++ test_must_fail env GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=http:https \
++ git clone "$HTTPD_URL/ftp-redir/repo.git" 2>stderr &&
++ {
++ test_i18ngrep "ftp.*disabled" stderr ||
++ test_i18ngrep "your curl version is too old"
++ }
++'
++
+ stop_httpd
+ test_done
diff --git a/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8845540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/git/CVE-2015-7545-patch5.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+commit b258116462399b318c86165c61a5c7123043cfd4
+Author: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com>
+Date: Tue Sep 22 18:06:20 2015 -0400
+
+ http: limit redirection depth
+
+ By default, libcurl will follow circular http redirects
+ forever. Let's put a cap on this so that somebody who can
+ trigger an automated fetch of an arbitrary repository (e.g.,
+ for CI) cannot convince git to loop infinitely.
+
+ The value chosen is 20, which is the same default that
+ Firefox uses.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+ Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+
+diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
+index 5a57bcc..00e3fc8 100644
+--- a/http.c
++++ b/http.c
+@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
+ }
+
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
++ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 20);
+ #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301
+ curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POSTREDIR, CURL_REDIR_POST_ALL);
+ #elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071101
+diff --git a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+index 68ef8ad..7d15e6d 100644
+--- a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
++++ b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-auth/(.*)$ /auth/smart/$1 [R=301]
+ RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-limited/(.*)/info/refs$ /smart/$1/info/refs [R=301]
+ RewriteRule ^/ftp-redir/(.*)$ ftp://localhost:1000/$1 [R=302]
+
++RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-(.*) /$1 [R=302]
++RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/(.*)$ /loop-redir/x-$1 [R=302]
++
+ <IfDefine SSL>
+ LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so
+
+diff --git a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+index 6a4f816..0d105d5 100755
+--- a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
++++ b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+@@ -25,5 +25,9 @@ test_expect_success 'curl redirects respect whitelist' '
+ }
+ '
+
++test_expect_success 'curl limits redirects' '
++ test_must_fail git clone "$HTTPD_URL/loop-redir/smart/repo.git"
++'
++
+ stop_httpd
+ test_done
--
2.2.1
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