This covers:
XSA-26 (CVE-2012-5510)
XSA-27 (CVE-2012-5511)
XSA-29 (CVE-2012-5513)
XSA-30 (CVE-2012-5514)
XSA-31 (CVE-2012-5515)
XSA-32 (CVE-2012-5525)
---
main/xen/APKBUILD | 14 ++++-
main/xen/xsa26-4.2.patch | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa27-4.2.patch | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch | 49 +++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa30-4.2.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch | 50 ++++++++++++++
main/xen/xsa32-4.2.patch | 22 ++++++
7 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa26-4.2.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa27-4.2.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa30-4.2.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch
create mode 100644 main/xen/xsa32-4.2.patch
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD
index fcb9306..e9503e8 100644
--- a/main/xen/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
pkgname=xen
pkgver=4.2.0
-pkgrel=6
+pkgrel=7
pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor"
url="http://www.xen.org/"
arch="x86 x86_64"
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ source="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.g
xsa23-4.2-unstable.patch
xsa24.patch
xsa25-4.2.patch
+ xsa26-4.2.patch
+ xsa27-4.2.patch
+ xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch
+ xsa30-4.2.patch
+ xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch
+ xsa32-4.2.patch
xenstored.initd
xenstored.confd
@@ -143,6 +149,12 @@ fb7e76f00c2a4e63b408cb67df7d1a7b xsa20.patch
9151e7c648b12f518826ad0f0a67da42 xsa23-4.2-unstable.patch
9bd8b30094f8eb2408846c1b6ed0cad6 xsa24.patch
9fc7097ed2e5e756c4ae91145c143433 xsa25-4.2.patch
+281ad5fefa8856a5b431a7830be6c370 xsa26-4.2.patch
+d8cb820b85f86caa58ce1cc215aac069 xsa27-4.2.patch
+405531d7e434be9bc663c601d4dc67a4 xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch
+23f5ca5789f5358b8d2f8ce998db5ed6 xsa30-4.2.patch
+78fa8ac0ac907dd3ae7ef02bea623bb5 xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch
+2bd8f676273e644910e6a907372dfa31 xsa32-4.2.patch
95d8af17bf844d41a015ff32aae51ba1 xenstored.initd
b017ccdd5e1c27bbf1513e3569d4ff07 xenstored.confd
ed262f15fb880badb53575539468646c xenconsoled.initd
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa26-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa26-4.2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44b8f34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa26-4.2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+gnttab: fix releasing of memory upon switches between versions
+
+gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() incompletely freed the pages
+previously used as status frame in that they did not get removed from
+the domain's xenpage_list, thus causing subsequent list corruption
+when those pages did get allocated again for the same or another purpose.
+
+Similarly, grant_table_create() and gnttab_grow_table() both improperly
+clean up in the event of an error - pages already shared with the guest
+can't be freed by just passing them to free_xenheap_page(). Fix this by
+sharing the pages only after all allocations succeeded.
+
+This is CVE-2012-5510 / XSA-26.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+index c01ad00..6fb2be9 100644
+--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
+@@ -1173,12 +1173,13 @@ fault:
+ }
+
+ static int
+-gnttab_populate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
++gnttab_populate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt,
++ unsigned int req_nr_frames)
+ {
+ unsigned i;
+ unsigned req_status_frames;
+
+- req_status_frames = grant_to_status_frames(gt->nr_grant_frames);
++ req_status_frames = grant_to_status_frames(req_nr_frames);
+ for ( i = nr_status_frames(gt); i < req_status_frames; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( (gt->status[i] = alloc_xenheap_page()) == NULL )
+@@ -1209,7 +1210,12 @@ gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames(struct domain *d, struct grant_table *gt)
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_status_frames(gt); i++ )
+ {
+- page_set_owner(virt_to_page(gt->status[i]), dom_xen);
++ struct page_info *pg = virt_to_page(gt->status[i]);
++
++ BUG_ON(page_get_owner(pg) != d);
++ if ( test_and_clear_bit(_PGC_allocated, &pg->count_info) )
++ put_page(pg);
++ BUG_ON(pg->count_info & ~PGC_xen_heap);
+ free_xenheap_page(gt->status[i]);
+ gt->status[i] = NULL;
+ }
+@@ -1247,19 +1253,18 @@ gnttab_grow_table(struct domain *d, unsigned int req_nr_frames)
+ clear_page(gt->shared_raw[i]);
+ }
+
+- /* Share the new shared frames with the recipient domain */
+- for ( i = nr_grant_frames(gt); i < req_nr_frames; i++ )
+- gnttab_create_shared_page(d, gt, i);
+-
+- gt->nr_grant_frames = req_nr_frames;
+-
+ /* Status pages - version 2 */
+ if (gt->gt_version > 1)
+ {
+- if ( gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt) )
++ if ( gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt, req_nr_frames) )
+ goto shared_alloc_failed;
+ }
+
++ /* Share the new shared frames with the recipient domain */
++ for ( i = nr_grant_frames(gt); i < req_nr_frames; i++ )
++ gnttab_create_shared_page(d, gt, i);
++ gt->nr_grant_frames = req_nr_frames;
++
+ return 1;
+
+ shared_alloc_failed:
+@@ -2157,7 +2162,7 @@ gnttab_set_version(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(gnttab_set_version_t uop))
+
+ if ( op.version == 2 && gt->gt_version < 2 )
+ {
+- res = gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt);
++ res = gnttab_populate_status_frames(d, gt, nr_grant_frames(gt));
+ if ( res < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+@@ -2600,14 +2605,15 @@ grant_table_create(
+ clear_page(t->shared_raw[i]);
+ }
+
+- for ( i = 0; i < INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES; i++ )
+- gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i);
+-
+ /* Status pages for grant table - for version 2 */
+ t->status = xzalloc_array(grant_status_t *,
+ grant_to_status_frames(max_nr_grant_frames));
+ if ( t->status == NULL )
+ goto no_mem_4;
++
++ for ( i = 0; i < INITIAL_NR_GRANT_FRAMES; i++ )
++ gnttab_create_shared_page(d, t, i);
++
+ t->nr_status_frames = 0;
+
+ /* Okay, install the structure. */
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa27-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa27-4.2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62a8d76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa27-4.2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+hvm: Limit the size of large HVM op batches
+
+Doing large p2m updates for HVMOP_track_dirty_vram without preemption
+ties up the physical processor. Integrating preemption into the p2m
+updates is hard so simply limit to 1GB which is sufficient for a 15000
+* 15000 * 32bpp framebuffer.
+
+For HVMOP_modified_memory and HVMOP_set_mem_type preemptible add the
+necessary machinery to handle preemption.
+
+This is CVE-2012-5511 / XSA-27.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+v2: Provide definition of GB to fix x86-32 compile.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+
+diff -r 7c4d806b3753 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Fri Nov 16 15:56:14 2012 +0000
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Mon Nov 19 14:42:10 2012 +0000
+@@ -3969,6 +3969,9 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+ goto param_fail2;
+
++ if ( a.nr > GB(1) >> PAGE_SHIFT )
++ goto param_fail2;
++
+ rc = xsm_hvm_param(d, op);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto param_fail2;
+@@ -3995,7 +3998,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ {
+ struct xen_hvm_modified_memory a;
+ struct domain *d;
+- unsigned long pfn;
+
+ if ( copy_from_guest(&a, arg, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+@@ -4022,9 +4024,11 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ if ( !paging_mode_log_dirty(d) )
+ goto param_fail3;
+
+- for ( pfn = a.first_pfn; pfn < a.first_pfn + a.nr; pfn++ )
++ while ( a.nr > 0 )
+ {
++ unsigned long pfn = a.first_pfn;
+ struct page_info *page;
++
+ page = get_page_from_gfn(d, pfn, NULL, P2M_UNSHARE);
+ if ( page )
+ {
+@@ -4034,6 +4038,19 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ sh_remove_shadows(d->vcpu[0], _mfn(page_to_mfn(page)), 1, 0);
+ put_page(page);
+ }
++
++ a.first_pfn++;
++ a.nr--;
++
++ /* Check for continuation if it's not the last interation */
++ if ( a.nr > 0 && hypercall_preempt_check() )
++ {
++ if ( copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ else
++ rc = -EAGAIN;
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+
+ param_fail3:
+@@ -4089,7 +4106,6 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ {
+ struct xen_hvm_set_mem_type a;
+ struct domain *d;
+- unsigned long pfn;
+
+ /* Interface types to internal p2m types */
+ p2m_type_t memtype[] = {
+@@ -4122,8 +4138,9 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ if ( a.hvmmem_type >= ARRAY_SIZE(memtype) )
+ goto param_fail4;
+
+- for ( pfn = a.first_pfn; pfn < a.first_pfn + a.nr; pfn++ )
++ while ( a.nr )
+ {
++ unsigned long pfn = a.first_pfn;
+ p2m_type_t t;
+ p2m_type_t nt;
+ mfn_t mfn;
+@@ -4163,6 +4180,19 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ }
+ }
+ put_gfn(d, pfn);
++
++ a.first_pfn++;
++ a.nr--;
++
++ /* Check for continuation if it's not the last interation */
++ if ( a.nr > 0 && hypercall_preempt_check() )
++ {
++ if ( copy_to_guest(arg, &a, 1) )
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ else
++ rc = -EAGAIN;
++ goto param_fail4;
++ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+diff -r 7c4d806b3753 xen/include/asm-x86/config.h
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h Fri Nov 16 15:56:14 2012 +0000
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h Mon Nov 19 14:42:10 2012 +0000
+@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ extern char wakeup_start[];
+ extern unsigned int video_mode, video_flags;
+ extern unsigned short boot_edid_caps;
+ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128];
++
++#define GB(_gb) (_gb ## UL << 30)
++
+ #endif
+
+ #define asmlinkage
+@@ -134,7 +137,6 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128]
+ #define PML4_ADDR(_slot) \
+ ((((_slot ## UL) >> 8) * 0xffff000000000000UL) | \
+ (_slot ## UL << PML4_ENTRY_BITS))
+-#define GB(_gb) (_gb ## UL << 30)
+ #else
+ #define PML4_ENTRY_BYTES (1 << PML4_ENTRY_BITS)
+ #define PML4_ADDR(_slot) \
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch b/main/xen/xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec3111f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa29-4.2-unstable.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+xen: add missing guest address range checks to XENMEM_exchange handlers
+
+Ever since its existence (3.0.3 iirc) the handler for this has been
+using non address range checking guest memory accessors (i.e.
+the ones prefixed with two underscores) without first range
+checking the accessed space (via guest_handle_okay()), allowing
+a guest to access and overwrite hypervisor memory.
+
+This is XSA-29 / CVE-2012-5513.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+index 996151c..a49f51b 100644
+--- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
+@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
+ (cmp.xchg.out.nr_extents << cmp.xchg.out.extent_order)) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if ( !compat_handle_okay(cmp.xchg.in.extent_start,
++ cmp.xchg.in.nr_extents) ||
++ !compat_handle_okay(cmp.xchg.out.extent_start,
++ cmp.xchg.out.nr_extents) )
++ return -EFAULT;
++
+ start_extent = cmp.xchg.nr_exchanged;
+ end_extent = (COMPAT_ARG_XLAT_SIZE - sizeof(*nat.xchg)) /
+ (((1U << ABS(order_delta)) + 1) *
+diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
+index 83e2666..bdb6ed8 100644
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -308,6 +308,13 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg)
+ goto fail_early;
+ }
+
++ if ( !guest_handle_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.in.nr_extents) ||
++ !guest_handle_okay(exch.out.extent_start, exch.out.nr_extents) )
++ {
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ goto fail_early;
++ }
++
+ /* Only privileged guests can allocate multi-page contiguous extents. */
+ if ( !multipage_allocation_permitted(current->domain,
+ exch.in.extent_order) ||
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa30-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa30-4.2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c46571d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa30-4.2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+xen: fix error handling of guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand()
+
+The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
+enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
+
+Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
+so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
+problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
+in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
+
+Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
+the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
+P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
+first place.
+
+This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+diff -r 7c4d806b3753 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Fri Nov 16 15:56:14 2012 +0000
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c Thu Nov 22 17:02:32 2012 +0000
+@@ -1117,6 +1117,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
+ mfn_t omfn;
+ int rc = 0;
+
++ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+@@ -1135,8 +1138,7 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
+ omfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &ot, &a, 0, NULL);
+ if ( p2m_is_ram(ot) )
+ {
+- printk("%s: gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n",
+- __func__, ot);
++ P2M_DEBUG("gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", ot);
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+@@ -1160,9 +1162,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
+ pod_unlock(p2m);
+ }
+
++out:
+ gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, order);
+
+-out:
+ return rc;
+ }
+
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch b/main/xen/xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2229c4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa31-4.2-unstable.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+memop: limit guest specified extent order
+
+Allowing unbounded order values here causes almost unbounded loops
+and/or partially incomplete requests, particularly in PoD code.
+
+The added range checks in populate_physmap(), decrease_reservation(),
+and the "in" one in memory_exchange() architecturally all could use
+PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT, and are being artificially constrained to
+MAX_ORDER.
+
+This is XSA-31 / CVE-2012-5515.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
+index 83e2666..2e56d46 100644
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ static void populate_physmap(struct memop_args *a)
+
+ if ( a->memflags & MEMF_populate_on_demand )
+ {
+- if ( guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn,
++ if ( a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER ||
++ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(d, gpfn,
+ a->extent_order) < 0 )
+ goto out;
+ }
+@@ -235,7 +236,8 @@ static void decrease_reservation(struct memop_args *a)
+ xen_pfn_t gmfn;
+
+ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(a->extent_list, a->nr_done,
+- a->nr_extents-1) )
++ a->nr_extents-1) ||
++ a->extent_order > MAX_ORDER )
+ return;
+
+ for ( i = a->nr_done; i < a->nr_extents; i++ )
+@@ -297,6 +299,9 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg)
+ if ( (exch.nr_exchanged > exch.in.nr_extents) ||
+ /* Input and output domain identifiers match? */
+ (exch.in.domid != exch.out.domid) ||
++ /* Extent orders are sensible? */
++ (exch.in.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) ||
++ (exch.out.extent_order > MAX_ORDER) ||
+ /* Sizes of input and output lists do not overflow a long? */
+ ((~0UL >> exch.in.extent_order) < exch.in.nr_extents) ||
+ ((~0UL >> exch.out.extent_order) < exch.out.nr_extents) ||
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa32-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa32-4.2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9800609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa32-4.2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+x86: get_page_from_gfn() must return NULL for invalid GFNs
+
+... also in the non-translated case.
+
+This is XSA-32 / CVE-2012-xxxx.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+index 7a7c7eb..d5665b8 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static inline struct page_info *get_page_from_gfn(
+ if (t)
+ *t = p2m_ram_rw;
+ page = __mfn_to_page(gfn);
+- return get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
++ return mfn_valid(gfn) && get_page(page, d) ? page : NULL;
+ }
+
+
--
1.7.7.5 (Apple Git-26)
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