X-Original-To: alpine-aports@mail.alpinelinux.org Delivered-To: alpine-aports@mail.alpinelinux.org Received: from mail.alpinelinux.org (dallas-a1.alpinelinux.org [127.0.0.1]) by mail.alpinelinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDD30DC0422 for ; Tue, 1 Dec 2015 22:14:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-wm0-f52.google.com (mail-wm0-f52.google.com [74.125.82.52]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.alpinelinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40B2CDC010D for ; Tue, 1 Dec 2015 22:14:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: by wmww144 with SMTP id w144so191999207wmw.1 for ; Tue, 01 Dec 2015 14:14:39 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kampka-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=/6G+l1qtInrCujQ83Rt5NDTlykEFsytg+HJLr2NG7W4=; b=szXp4u231zUzMquIK5MJ7aBufUsnkqVlzarTCL6qQ2P1Civ0g4pg5iAF0FZqUIuJQV GSyYVlchkxs7qBrsL16dB6HtShhZ5X0n7x+zO0Uou0XOsrJG0pmWY6m4r7xZ9zAqzqPV srECwYceGLQ5d0mdesrWL508ud6y9nO6jekcZAf3oZH0uKf9QB6XKTBZCpJgjKFkCPZh G2ewIxPfG4bCUKJ/TLJ+VgLIi8MjIKEtQlSWpM7yRPwXuM6+1ilshTXpaTLT+6yaql/v UjtpCRx/VqNrfJZIwjKfzpXXuqLQt6E0EkQJnFcmaKuNp4vdAdUfPYC0my+uI8Kv31P3 Br3A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=/6G+l1qtInrCujQ83Rt5NDTlykEFsytg+HJLr2NG7W4=; b=KrOZT/2FXOQV+ZEdQp0H7XW+mNyLdPp89M1Q4bJfIYHJ4iMsp/PumWTJZHVr+FMrun WkKGIhZzpLnhC1Gq2GbjvpvtUKuvrOxNEGNoOj+/trzIeUqhaAlKCxpehbBXL2wLrKnS a/gb/cJ8gc7Ix8aCnkq0VFJ+hKx1wB/3izGGTQP68En8+tmriuQFOW0XFqMj2gcpLkGm yHmq1a3lDwBw7qWl4KklomjbXBufqhIr+1hzHFXR0dOhCD1Fu0iGslfubKlORZcVziIA WAhI966uL96vF5oR6497CPcxVCNEDFYpJ2ZIXVoxk9lVMCuw/IBT7H6BAOzQZOvbebS8 eekg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQnQuZg1JyITFc0jndQXoylIvuRUD0HP4UblBG0pjnbBZd/bUiF9BuZ5pcoANjPRG15cglIL X-Received: by 10.28.222.138 with SMTP id v132mr682773wmg.23.1449008079681; Tue, 01 Dec 2015 14:14:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (pD9579EF6.dip0.t-ipconnect.de. [217.87.158.246]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ot9sm53591866wjc.12.2015.12.01.14.14.38 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 01 Dec 2015 14:14:38 -0800 (PST) From: Christian Kampka To: alpine-aports@lists.alpinelinux.org Cc: Christian Kampka Subject: [alpine-aports] [PATCH] main/krb5: security fixes (CVE-2015-2694, CVE-2015-2695, CVE-2015-2696, CVE-2015-2697) Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 23:14:36 +0100 Message-Id: <1449008076-25870-1-git-send-email-christian@kampka.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.6.2 X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP X-Mailinglist: alpine-aports Precedence: list List-Id: Alpine Development List-Unsubscribe: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: fixes: #4836 --- main/krb5/APKBUILD | 18 +- main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch | 101 ++++++ main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch | 564 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch | 731 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch | 50 +++ 5 files changed, 1463 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch create mode 100644 main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch diff --git a/main/krb5/APKBUILD b/main/krb5/APKBUILD index d3ddfc9..fef6004 100644 --- a/main/krb5/APKBUILD +++ b/main/krb5/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa pkgname=krb5 pkgver=1.13.1 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 case $pkgver in *.*.*) _ver=${pkgver%.*};; @@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-server $pkgname-server-ldap:ldap $pkgname-pkinit $pkgname-libs" source="http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/krb5/${_ver}/krb5-$pkgver-signed.tar mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch + CVE-2015-2694.patch + CVE-2015-2695.patch + CVE-2015-2696.patch + CVE-2015-2697.patch krb5kadmind.initd krb5kdc.initd @@ -120,16 +124,28 @@ libs() { md5sums="567586cdf02aa8c842c2fab7a94f3c1f krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar c84a0c7d8014e3528524956ffdd1c3e9 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +98d4792ff9576efab658be312ef7623f CVE-2015-2694.patch +ca73fdd31a2d5c38993afbed909b5417 CVE-2015-2695.patch +dc4c2a99b5b8a9bf7b306d614134c267 CVE-2015-2696.patch +a2369d91ccef67f093af594d941ebc11 CVE-2015-2697.patch 9c0e3bac122326cdbbbac068056ee8af krb5kadmind.initd 71131479c07a2d89b30a2ea18dd64e74 krb5kdc.initd d94873a6a1ac6277adf2d25458eda9e5 krb5kpropd.initd" sha256sums="4df629fdf97f362cf81edbf38d613b32b492dd88c876cf3aa1c66562f296663e krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar 84007c7423f67db7a8b248b9643c49ef25f2d56ce15c2574eb41ecbf51bcd3f2 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +f3710f2f90542145a8921dc7c2b8241d8fdeccdcba3d50b1758aa0e2f8aeec73 CVE-2015-2694.patch +b83dd0714f1ab164f6eb50d173bec25bb851c739ed5b1c38b35e7a1910cff25b CVE-2015-2695.patch +add426d86d31c57dc8e1c1d9043f61c21f2e532e728d1d9c703b2616bf246d7c CVE-2015-2696.patch +e1d3d6a0dfede9d5a4af83d51c4f5fad13e917e4cb58672ff0ee3e8f34fe0379 CVE-2015-2697.patch 213a5b04f091e4644e856aabc38da586bd86c4616ab15f00eefca52fca7137d6 krb5kadmind.initd 577842c7fe4639a8e9dd349da40e514284dd53440bb71be58283faaf18508f9a krb5kdc.initd 1644639d83791bd871f3c89a53a7052ab52994d3ef03d1d675d4217130c1fa94 krb5kpropd.initd" sha512sums="f26dce8f682bd3fbf38a15df5f91722b573d4df4cc193f7ba8dc369cbbee8f4bc2a72f56513d2cf27697ce8baaf954afe04e3eefc15c2883fa1d5260145aef6e krb5-1.13.1-signed.tar 5a3782ff17b383f8cd0415fd13538ab56afd788130d6ad640e9f2682b7deaae7f25713ce358058ed771091040dccf62a3bc87e6fd473d505ec189a95debcc801 mit-krb5_krb5-config_LDFLAGS.patch +0c8ab8a1d6bfa31b3257c1ac4f99d9c14d4f8ed0c27da0e648f64e9e5e5717ca5d929def6fd1f04903b287786add4a93e8f1c1f96cea14d123c1574c174a532a CVE-2015-2694.patch +4e1499d799bed90b2857d24de29ea3bb7500b514a86c2a8f4596fb80f97f01445b7dd9d0cb19c1cfb1f03f5c6a8e2a2149a6278c720933181db8e188063dcc6a CVE-2015-2695.patch +d27e836a3e8a1ca6b711c0ce4f9f68cbd42d888cb9dcaf2dcb78fdc9ca7652865c124e14c7026b4e94a722a314a0c30f732cc00344973ee5a180f11901347ed1 CVE-2015-2696.patch +5f6a630b566c9f0cb02528fca3a789547e294acf5f3435eb62b79411187e4fcaaa58b81eff34e8ac6cbca3dacb076bd626a31687c04936b35bf7ab3e35965a31 CVE-2015-2697.patch 43b9885b7eb8d0d60920def688de482f2b1701288f9acb1bb21dc76b2395428ff304961959eb04ba5eafd0412bae35668d6d2c8223424b9337bc051eadf51682 krb5kadmind.initd ede15f15bbbc9d0227235067abe15245bb9713aea260d397379c63275ce74aea0db6c91c15d599e40c6e89612d76f3a0f8fdd21cbafa3f30d426d4310d3e2cec krb5kdc.initd 45be0d421efd41e9dd056125a750c90856586e990317456b68170d733b03cba9ecd18ab87603b20e49575e7839fb4a6d628255533f2631f9e8ddb7f3cc493a90 krb5kpropd.initd" diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6154965 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2694.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From df8afc60d970a7176a55ffe7ce21cfd57ba423cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Greg Hudson +Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 12:02:37 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694] + +In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until +the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth +module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured +realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to +erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated. + +CVE-2015-2694: + +In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT +support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the +requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext +encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be +used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's +password. + + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C + +(cherry picked from commit e3b5a5e5267818c97750b266df50b6a3d4649604) + +ticket: 8160 +version_fixed: 1.13.2 +status: resolved +--- + src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c | 10 +++++++--- + src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c +index bf9c6a8..7941b4a 100644 +--- a/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c ++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/otp/main.c +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static krb5_preauthtype otp_pa_type_list[] = + struct request_state { + krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond; + void *arg; ++ krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply; + }; + + static krb5_error_code +@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ on_response(void *data, krb5_error_code retval, otp_response response) + if (retval == 0 && response != otp_response_success) + retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED; + ++ if (retval == 0) ++ rs.enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH; ++ + rs.respond(rs.arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + +@@ -263,8 +267,6 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, + krb5_data d, plaintext; + char *config; + +- enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH; +- + /* Get the FAST armor key. */ + armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock); + if (armor_key == NULL) { +@@ -298,12 +300,14 @@ otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, + goto error; + } + +- /* Create the request state. */ ++ /* Create the request state. Save the response callback, and the ++ * enc_tkt_reply pointer so we can set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH flag later. */ + rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval); + if (rs == NULL) + goto error; + rs->arg = arg; + rs->respond = respond; ++ rs->enc_tkt_reply = enc_tkt_reply; + + /* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */ + retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config); +diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c +index 5639fca..edfce6f 100644 +--- a/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c ++++ b/src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c +@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context, + + pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n"); + if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) { +- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + return; + } + +@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context, + + plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server); + if (plgctx == NULL) { +- (*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + return; + } + diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..08bc8ab --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2695.patch @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +From b51b33f2bc5d1497ddf5bd107f791c101695000d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nicolas Williams +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:27:52 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695] + +The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the +mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that +most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This +assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some +programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context +establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and +opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in +gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment. + +CVE-2015-2695: + +In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call +gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can +cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type, +generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because +the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context +after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server +applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this +bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the +gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined +results, but applications should not make access control decisions +based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment. + + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C + +[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case +behavior changes; commit message and CVE description] + +ticket: 8244 +target_version: 1.14 +tags: pullup +--- + src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h | 2 + + src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h +index 57372de..5c82764 100644 +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h +@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ typedef struct { + int firstpass; + int mech_complete; + int nego_done; ++ int initiate; ++ int opened; + OM_uint32 ctx_flags; + gss_name_t internal_name; + gss_OID actual_mech; +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c +index ef76e1f..7849c85 100644 +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c +@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static OM_uint32 get_negotiable_mechs(OM_uint32 *, spnego_gss_cred_id_t, + gss_cred_usage_t, gss_OID_set *); + static void release_spnego_ctx(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *); + static void check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t); +-static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(void); ++static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t create_spnego_ctx(int); + static int put_mech_set(gss_OID_set mechSet, gss_buffer_t buf); + static int put_input_token(unsigned char **, gss_buffer_t, unsigned int); + static int put_mech_oid(unsigned char **, gss_OID_const, unsigned int); +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ check_spnego_options(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx) + } + + static spnego_gss_ctx_id_t +-create_spnego_ctx(void) ++create_spnego_ctx(int initiate) + { + spnego_gss_ctx_id_t spnego_ctx = NULL; + spnego_ctx = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t) +@@ -477,6 +477,8 @@ create_spnego_ctx(void) + spnego_ctx->mic_rcvd = 0; + spnego_ctx->mech_complete = 0; + spnego_ctx->nego_done = 0; ++ spnego_ctx->opened = 0; ++ spnego_ctx->initiate = initiate; + spnego_ctx->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + spnego_ctx->actual_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; + +@@ -642,7 +644,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + OM_uint32 ret; + spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = NULL; + +- sc = create_spnego_ctx(); ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(1); + if (sc == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + +@@ -659,10 +661,7 @@ init_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } +- /* +- * The actual context is not yet determined, set the output +- * context handle to refer to the spnego context itself. +- */ ++ + sc->ctx_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + *ctx = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc; + sc = NULL; +@@ -1108,16 +1107,11 @@ spnego_gss_init_sec_context( + } + gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &mechtok_out); + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- /* +- * Now, switch the output context to refer to the +- * negotiated mechanism's context. +- */ +- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)spnego_ctx->ctx_handle; ++ spnego_ctx->opened = 1; + if (actual_mech != NULL) + *actual_mech = spnego_ctx->actual_mech; + if (ret_flags != NULL) + *ret_flags = spnego_ctx->ctx_flags; +- release_spnego_ctx(&spnego_ctx); + } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + if (spnego_ctx != NULL) { + gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, +@@ -1285,7 +1279,7 @@ acc_ctx_hints(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + goto cleanup; + +- sc = create_spnego_ctx(); ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0); + if (sc == NULL) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; +@@ -1367,7 +1361,7 @@ acc_ctx_new(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_release_buffer(&tmpmin, &sc->DER_mechTypes); + assert(mech_wanted != GSS_C_NO_OID); + } else +- sc = create_spnego_ctx(); ++ sc = create_spnego_ctx(0); + if (sc == NULL) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *return_token = NO_TOKEN_SEND; +@@ -1750,13 +1744,12 @@ spnego_gss_accept_sec_context( + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)sc->ctx_handle; ++ sc->opened = 1; + if (sc->internal_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME && + src_name != NULL) { + *src_name = sc->internal_name; + sc->internal_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + } +- release_spnego_ctx(&sc); + } else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + if (sc != NULL) { + gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle, +@@ -2069,8 +2062,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap( + gss_qop_t *qop_state) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + input_message_buffer, + output_message_buffer, + conf_state, +@@ -2090,8 +2088,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap( + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_wrap(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_req_flag, + qop_req, + input_message_buffer, +@@ -2108,8 +2111,14 @@ spnego_gss_process_context_token( + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ /* SPNEGO doesn't have its own context tokens. */ ++ if (!sc->opened) ++ return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN); ++ + ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + token_buffer); + + return (ret); +@@ -2133,19 +2142,9 @@ spnego_gss_delete_sec_context( + if (*ctx == NULL) + return (GSS_S_COMPLETE); + +- /* +- * If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally. +- */ +- if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) { +- (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, +- &(*ctx)->ctx_handle, +- output_token); +- (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx); +- } else { +- ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, +- context_handle, +- output_token); +- } ++ (void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &(*ctx)->ctx_handle, ++ output_token); ++ (void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx); + + return (ret); + } +@@ -2157,8 +2156,13 @@ spnego_gss_context_time( + OM_uint32 *time_rec) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_context_time(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + time_rec); + return (ret); + } +@@ -2170,9 +2174,20 @@ spnego_gss_export_sec_context( + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = *(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle; ++ ++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established ++ * contexts. */ ++ if (!sc->opened) ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; ++ + ret = gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ &sc->ctx_handle, + interprocess_token); ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { ++ release_spnego_ctx(&sc); ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; ++ } + return (ret); + } + +@@ -2182,11 +2197,12 @@ spnego_gss_import_sec_context( + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle) + { +- OM_uint32 ret; +- ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status, +- interprocess_token, +- context_handle); +- return (ret); ++ /* ++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO ++ * exported context tokens, only tokens for underlying mechs. So just ++ * return an error for now. ++ */ ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } + #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */ + +@@ -2203,16 +2219,48 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_context( + int *opened) + { + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (src_name != NULL) ++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ if (targ_name != NULL) ++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL) ++ *lifetime_rec = 0; ++ if (mech_type != NULL) ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego; ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) ++ *ctx_flags = 0; ++ if (locally_initiated != NULL) ++ *locally_initiated = sc->initiate; ++ if (opened != NULL) ++ *opened = sc->opened; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { ++ ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, ++ src_name, targ_name, lifetime_rec, ++ mech_type, ctx_flags, NULL, NULL); ++ } + +- ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, +- context_handle, +- src_name, +- targ_name, +- lifetime_rec, +- mech_type, +- ctx_flags, +- locally_initiated, +- opened); ++ if (!sc->opened) { ++ /* ++ * We are still doing SPNEGO negotiation, so report SPNEGO as ++ * the OID. After negotiation is complete we will report the ++ * underlying mechanism OID. ++ */ ++ if (mech_type != NULL) ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_spnego; ++ ++ /* ++ * Remove flags we don't support with partially-established ++ * contexts. (Change this to keep GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG if we add ++ * support for exporting partial SPNEGO contexts.) ++ */ ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) { ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG; ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; ++ } ++ } + + return (ret); + } +@@ -2227,8 +2275,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit( + OM_uint32 *max_input_size) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_req_flag, + qop_req, + req_output_size, +@@ -2245,8 +2298,13 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic( + gss_buffer_t message_token) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_get_mic(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + qop_req, + message_buffer, + message_token); +@@ -2262,8 +2320,13 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic( + gss_qop_t *qop_state) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + msg_buffer, + token_buffer, + qop_state); +@@ -2278,8 +2341,14 @@ spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid( + gss_buffer_set_t *data_set) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function. */ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE); ++ + ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + desired_object, + data_set); + return (ret); +@@ -2359,8 +2428,15 @@ spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option( + const gss_buffer_t value) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)*context_handle; ++ ++ /* There are no SPNEGO-specific OIDs for this function, and we cannot ++ * construct an empty SPNEGO context with it. */ ++ if (sc == NULL || sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE); ++ + ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ &sc->ctx_handle, + desired_object, + value); + return (ret); +@@ -2377,8 +2453,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_wrap_aead(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_req_flag, + qop_req, + input_assoc_buffer, +@@ -2399,8 +2480,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_qop_t *qop_state) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + input_message_buffer, + input_assoc_buffer, + output_payload_buffer, +@@ -2419,8 +2505,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + int iov_count) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_req_flag, + qop_req, + conf_state, +@@ -2438,8 +2529,13 @@ spnego_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + int iov_count) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_state, + qop_state, + iov, +@@ -2457,8 +2553,13 @@ spnego_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + int iov_count) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + conf_req_flag, + qop_req, + conf_state, +@@ -2475,8 +2576,13 @@ spnego_gss_complete_auth_token( + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE); ++ + ret = gss_complete_auth_token(minor_status, +- context_handle, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + input_message_buffer); + return (ret); + } +@@ -2721,8 +2827,13 @@ spnego_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t prf_out) + { + OM_uint32 ret; ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ + ret = gss_pseudo_random(minor_status, +- context, ++ sc->ctx_handle, + prf_key, + prf_in, + desired_output_len, +@@ -2863,7 +2974,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count) + { +- return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov, ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ ++ return gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov, + iov_count); + } + +@@ -2872,7 +2988,12 @@ spnego_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count) + { +- return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, context_handle, qop_state, iov, ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ ++ return gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_state, iov, + iov_count); + } + +@@ -2881,7 +3002,12 @@ spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count) + { +- return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov, ++ spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); ++ ++ return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, sc->ctx_handle, qop_req, iov, + iov_count); + } + diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1f50a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2696.patch @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@ +From e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nicolas Williams +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 12:28:36 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696] + +The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the +krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that +most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This +assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some +programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context +establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that +type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context +structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context +establishment. + +CVE-2015-2696: + +In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call +gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can +cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type, +generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the +native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted +IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed +with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make +access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior +to context establishment. + + CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C + +[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case +behavior changes; commit message and CVE description] + +ticket: 8244 +target_version: 1.14 +tags: pullup +--- + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h | 114 ++++++++++++ + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c | 105 +++++++++-- + src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c | 351 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 3 files changed, 529 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h +index 9aae12a..97e090d 100644 +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapiP_krb5.h +@@ -621,6 +621,21 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext + ); + #endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */ + ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid ++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ ++ const gss_ctx_id_t, ++ /* context_handle */ ++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */ ++ gss_buffer_set_t* /* data_set */ ++); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option ++(OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ ++ gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ ++ const gss_OID, /* desired_object */ ++ const gss_buffer_t/* value */ ++); ++ + OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ +@@ -1302,6 +1317,105 @@ OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV + krb5_gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_buffer_t token, + gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle); + ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ OM_uint32 *time_rec); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t *src_name, ++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec, ++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags, ++ int *locally_initiated, int *opened); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, ++ gss_buffer_t message_token); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, ++ int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, ++ int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state, ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size, ++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size); ++ ++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token); ++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */ ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ const gss_OID desired_object, ++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, ++ const gss_OID desired_object, ++ const gss_buffer_t value); ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in, ++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t prf_out); ++ + /* Magic string to identify exported krb5 GSS credentials. Increment this if + * the format changes. */ + #define CRED_EXPORT_MAGIC "K5C1" +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c +index 0be92e4..c4dfdd6 100644 +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/gssapi_krb5.c +@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct { + } + }; + +-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV + krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_OID desired_object, +@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static struct { + }; + #endif + +-static OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV + krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, + const gss_OID desired_object, +@@ -929,20 +929,103 @@ static struct gss_config krb5_mechanism = { + krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length, + }; + ++/* Functions which use security contexts or acquire creds are IAKERB-specific; ++ * other functions can borrow from the krb5 mech. */ ++static struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = { ++ { GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID_LENGTH, GSS_MECH_KRB5_OID }, ++ NULL, ++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred, ++ krb5_gss_release_cred, ++ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context, ++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT ++ NULL, ++#else ++ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context, ++#endif ++ iakerb_gss_process_context_token, ++ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context, ++ iakerb_gss_context_time, ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic, ++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic, ++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_WRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE) ++ NULL, ++#else ++ iakerb_gss_wrap, ++#endif ++#if defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE_UNWRAP) || defined(IOV_SHIM_EXERCISE) ++ NULL, ++#else ++ iakerb_gss_unwrap, ++#endif ++ krb5_gss_display_status, ++ krb5_gss_indicate_mechs, ++ krb5_gss_compare_name, ++ krb5_gss_display_name, ++ krb5_gss_import_name, ++ krb5_gss_release_name, ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred, ++ NULL, /* add_cred */ ++#ifdef LEAN_CLIENT ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++#else ++ iakerb_gss_export_sec_context, ++ NULL, ++#endif ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_mech, ++ krb5_gss_inquire_names_for_mech, ++ iakerb_gss_inquire_context, ++ krb5_gss_internal_release_oid, ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit, ++ krb5_gss_localname, ++ krb5_gss_authorize_localname, ++ krb5_gss_export_name, ++ krb5_gss_duplicate_name, ++ krb5_gss_store_cred, ++ iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid, ++ krb5_gss_inquire_cred_by_oid, ++ iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option, ++ krb5_gssspi_set_cred_option, ++ krb5_gssspi_mech_invoke, ++ NULL, /* wrap_aead */ ++ NULL, /* unwrap_aead */ ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov, ++ iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov, ++ iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length, ++ NULL, /* complete_auth_token */ ++ NULL, /* acquire_cred_impersonate_name */ ++ NULL, /* add_cred_impersonate_name */ ++ NULL, /* display_name_ext */ ++ krb5_gss_inquire_name, ++ krb5_gss_get_name_attribute, ++ krb5_gss_set_name_attribute, ++ krb5_gss_delete_name_attribute, ++ krb5_gss_export_name_composite, ++ krb5_gss_map_name_to_any, ++ krb5_gss_release_any_name_mapping, ++ iakerb_gss_pseudo_random, ++ NULL, /* set_neg_mechs */ ++ krb5_gss_inquire_saslname_for_mech, ++ krb5_gss_inquire_mech_for_saslname, ++ krb5_gss_inquire_attrs_for_mech, ++ krb5_gss_acquire_cred_from, ++ krb5_gss_store_cred_into, ++ iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password, ++ krb5_gss_export_cred, ++ krb5_gss_import_cred, ++ NULL, /* import_sec_context_by_mech */ ++ NULL, /* import_name_by_mech */ ++ NULL, /* import_cred_by_mech */ ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov, ++ iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov, ++ iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length, ++}; ++ + #ifdef _GSS_STATIC_LINK + #include "mglueP.h" + static int gss_iakerbmechglue_init(void) + { + struct gss_mech_config mech_iakerb; +- struct gss_config iakerb_mechanism = krb5_mechanism; +- +- /* IAKERB mechanism mirrors krb5, but with different context SPIs */ +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_accept_sec_context = iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context; +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_init_sec_context = iakerb_gss_init_sec_context; +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_delete_sec_context = iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context; +- iakerb_mechanism.gss_acquire_cred = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred; +- iakerb_mechanism.gssspi_acquire_cred_with_password +- = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred_with_password; + + memset(&mech_iakerb, 0, sizeof(mech_iakerb)); + mech_iakerb.mech = &iakerb_mechanism; +diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c +index f30de32..4662bd9 100644 +--- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c ++++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c +@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ struct _iakerb_ctx_id_rec { + gss_ctx_id_t gssc; + krb5_data conv; /* conversation for checksumming */ + unsigned int count; /* number of round trips */ ++ int initiate; ++ int established; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *gic_opts; + }; + +@@ -695,7 +697,7 @@ iakerb_get_initial_state(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx, + * Allocate and initialise an IAKERB context + */ + static krb5_error_code +-iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx) ++iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx, int initiate) + { + iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx; + krb5_error_code code; +@@ -709,6 +711,8 @@ iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx) + ctx->magic = KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT; + ctx->state = IAKERB_AS_REQ; + ctx->count = 0; ++ ctx->initiate = initiate; ++ ctx->established = 0; + + code = krb5_gss_init_context(&ctx->k5c); + if (code != 0) +@@ -732,7 +736,7 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token) + { +- OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle; + + if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) { + output_token->length = 0; +@@ -740,23 +744,10 @@ iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + } + + *minor_status = 0; ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; ++ iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx); + +- if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { +- iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle; +- +- if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) { +- iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx); +- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; +- } else { +- assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT); +- +- major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, +- context_handle, +- output_token); +- } +- } +- +- return major_status; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + static krb5_boolean +@@ -802,7 +793,7 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT); + + if (initialContextToken) { +- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx); ++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 0); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + +@@ -854,11 +845,8 @@ iakerb_gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + time_rec, + delegated_cred_handle, + &exts); +- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- *context_handle = ctx->gssc; +- ctx->gssc = NULL; +- iakerb_release_context(ctx); +- } ++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ ctx->established = 1; + if (mech_type != NULL) + *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5; + } +@@ -897,7 +885,7 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT); + + if (initialContextToken) { +- code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx); ++ code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx, 1); + if (code != 0) { + *minor_status = code; + goto cleanup; +@@ -983,11 +971,8 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + ret_flags, + time_rec, + &exts); +- if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- *context_handle = ctx->gssc; +- ctx->gssc = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; +- iakerb_release_context(ctx); +- } ++ if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ ctx->established = 1; + if (actual_mech_type != NULL) + *actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5; + } else { +@@ -1010,3 +995,309 @@ iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + + return major_status; + } ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_unwrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, int *conf_state, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_unwrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, input_message_buffer, ++ output_message_buffer, conf_state, qop_state); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, ++ gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, int *conf_state, ++ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_wrap(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, qop_req, ++ input_message_buffer, conf_state, ++ output_message_buffer); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_process_context_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ const gss_buffer_t token_buffer) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, ctx->gssc, ++ token_buffer); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_context_time(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ OM_uint32 *time_rec) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, ctx->gssc, time_rec); ++} ++ ++#ifndef LEAN_CLIENT ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj; ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ /* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */ ++ if (!ctx->established) ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; ++ ++ maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc, ++ interprocess_token); ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { ++ iakerb_release_context(ctx); ++ *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; ++ } ++ return maj; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Until we implement partial context exports, there are no SPNEGO exported ++ * context tokens, only tokens for the underlying krb5 context. So we do not ++ * need to implement an iakerb_gss_import_sec_context() yet; it would be ++ * unreachable except via a manually constructed token. ++ */ ++ ++#endif /* LEAN_CLIENT */ ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t *src_name, ++ gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec, ++ gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags, ++ int *initiate, int *opened) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 ret; ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (src_name != NULL) ++ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ if (targ_name != NULL) ++ *targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ if (lifetime_rec != NULL) ++ *lifetime_rec = 0; ++ if (mech_type != NULL) ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb; ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) ++ *ctx_flags = 0; ++ if (initiate != NULL) ++ *initiate = ctx->initiate; ++ if (opened != NULL) ++ *opened = ctx->established; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ ++ ret = krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, ctx->gssc, src_name, ++ targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, ++ ctx_flags, initiate, opened); ++ ++ if (!ctx->established) { ++ /* Report IAKERB as the mech OID until the context is established. */ ++ if (mech_type != NULL) ++ *mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb; ++ ++ /* We don't support exporting partially-established contexts. */ ++ if (ctx_flags != NULL) ++ *ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, OM_uint32 req_output_size, ++ OM_uint32 *max_input_size) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, ++ qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer, ++ gss_buffer_t message_token) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, message_buffer, ++ message_token); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_buffer_t msg_buffer, gss_buffer_t token_buffer, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, msg_buffer, ++ token_buffer, qop_state); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ const gss_OID desired_object, ++ gss_buffer_set_t *data_set) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status, ctx->gssc, ++ desired_object, data_set); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_set_sec_context_option(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, ++ const gss_OID desired_object, ++ const gss_buffer_t value) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status, &ctx->gssc, ++ desired_object, value); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, qop_req, ++ conf_state, iov, iov_count); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_unwrap_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_state, qop_state, ++ iov, iov_count); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, int conf_req_flag, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_wrap_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc, conf_req_flag, ++ qop_req, conf_state, iov, iov_count); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_pseudo_random(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ int prf_key, const gss_buffer_t prf_in, ++ ssize_t desired_output_len, gss_buffer_t prf_out) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_pseudo_random(minor_status, ctx->gssc, prf_key, prf_in, ++ desired_output_len, prf_out); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, ++ int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, iov, ++ iov_count); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, ++ gss_qop_t *qop_state, gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, ++ int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_verify_mic_iov(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_state, iov, ++ iov_count); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 KRB5_CALLCONV ++iakerb_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, ++ gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req, ++ gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count) ++{ ++ iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle; ++ ++ if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) ++ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT; ++ ++ return krb5_gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, iov, ++ iov_count); ++} diff --git a/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af2f42a --- /dev/null +++ b/main/krb5/CVE-2015-2697.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From f0c094a1b745d91ef2f9a4eae2149aac026a5789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Greg Hudson +Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:51:47 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697] + +In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a +copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of +bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug +affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and +krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not +affected. + +CVE-2015-2697: + +In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to +cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field +beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to +answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using +krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this +function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the +realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length. +Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond +the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash. + +CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C + +ticket: 8252 (new) +target_version: 1.14 +tags: pullup +--- + src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c +index ab6fed8..8604268 100644 +--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c ++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/bld_princ.c +@@ -40,10 +40,8 @@ build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ, + data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data)); + if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; } + +- if (!retval) { +- r = strdup(realm); +- if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; } +- } ++ if (!retval) ++ r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval); + + while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) { + if (count == size) { -- 2.6.2 --- Unsubscribe: alpine-aports+unsubscribe@lists.alpinelinux.org Help: alpine-aports+help@lists.alpinelinux.org ---