Received: from lavabit.com (lavabit.com [38.107.241.66]) by nld3-dev1.alpinelinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E408F781A15 for ; Tue, 23 Jul 2019 08:27:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from darla.localdomain (abts-north-dynamic-089.106.177.122.airtelbroadband.in [122.177.106.89]) by lavabit.com with ESMTP id XRE5RFZR4PC6 for ; Tue, 23 Jul 2019 03:27:11 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lavabit.com; s=bazinga; t=1563870431; bh=zLkjj1keRotywKlMgk0bsr6uOszJYAJ6TqlZKShHPyY=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Openpgp:Message-ID:Date:User-Agent: MIME-Version:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Language; b=QZ1mUMsXf0KqIwDSuaSg8dkxVNkiGa1xHgIlImfJqjMUjdOi/v9wArcSh6JSvxb8N Y00pC02tTknrfZrS2+aepakSVkJt83UrNEansTFLFgEvJYMXyS66HjMyRm1cTo7Dvu P/5JiFA8VycpbhGnQyM1/Qbs54/a/X6aKDCTgL6zH3xT7Bap/CSlbwFFt/Tfh31E1J rnFV3C1boUzUGK9wegZigRwCkugFVNbofdKucHLTeIRF5P5TW4U3CmGGricv9y/3vb 6eC6oYTgK2OAN5WSNYXWKd3oQmOMv9C30vSzp4cNhRuwnAtqnN4OFWGb4d3JD2QV/g G0fUsTIHT9PGA== Subject: AllowTcpForwarding no (by default) To: alpine-devel@lists.alpinelinux.org References: =?utf-8?q?=3CeoZaVoQE-Nwu7bWHQvp1nFFgC7gHv9cSlhLcb8fyi-Z8DdeDgAL?= =?utf-8?q?MWZV6NZ-ZTNy0Cc7-JA4qrf9rklRzvXuuhpnXkD=5FowVF14vDRWW4uM48=3D?= =?utf-8?q?=40duniel=2Eno=3E?= From: Ladar Levison Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Message-ID: <04299073-f21e-45ec-3c95-548b2a16c53d@lavabit.com> Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 13:57:08 +0530 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US Just wondering what the motivation behind commit 8d2a4e449d4e15ddcf41ab1aade94a83f6ed4308 ... which updates the default OpenSSH daemon config with 'AllowTcpForwarding no'. Was there a reason or specific attack vector the change is meant to mitigate? All I could find is a vague reference to bad passwords? It seems to me the two things are unrelated, as the port is still exposed if the machine has a public IP address. All this does is make it more difficult for an admin to setup an explicit port forwarding rule. All I could fine was this: https://git.alpinelinux.org/aports/commit/?id=3D495bbd7fb1f07c23a1f2d47a0= 71aa5519e08744c I've been asked to restore the old value, aka 'AllowTcpForwarding yes', in my virtual machine base boxes, and I don't see an obvious reason to deny the request, as the new default causes port forwarding to break. And forwarding an SSH port from a virtual guest, to accessible IP address seems like a common enough=C2=A0 use case for virtual machines, t= hat I'm thinking it should. But before I accept the pull request, and let loose the change across the internet, I wanted to solicit other opinions? The pull request in question: https://github.com/lavabit/robox/pull/66 L~