Received: from out1.migadu.com (out1.migadu.com [91.121.223.63]) by nld3-dev1.alpinelinux.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2CD03781F06 for <~alpine/users@lists.alpinelinux.org>; Mon, 11 May 2020 02:47:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Report-Abuse: Please report any abuse attempt to abuse@migadu.com and include these headers. DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=dereferenced.org; s=default; t=1589165273; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Qi3aqf4K7CmTAu7ThiUXAPJ8gUZbgQ9CrdsxSdb+gv4=; b=rKftqkd0NSO0iVFQ3i/Ijfg3ZHhVl8oBrFkeRYZxcEdowef1qZgifH3sQcHEzfbRq2Hsd/ vtr+vxLh3FgtUAtHDnS6uYmR5Xg5H0DLd/yQUIscoAkDsSb0MbnEm4VGPSd1bp7nC5MDkv U6ZVXeIReJIN+CKxKIVuQo0HfwuqXdg= From: Ariadne Conill To: ~alpine/users@lists.alpinelinux.org Subject: Re: Are the repos/apk using http or https? Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 20:47:48 -0600 Message-ID: <1770621.52O7J0OIYB@localhost> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Score: 1.40 Hello, On Saturday, May 9, 2020 2:32:41 PM MDT Joe Duarte wrote: > Hi all =E2=80=93 I was thrown off by the URLs in the mirror list. They're= all > insecure / http. Is Alpine literally making unencrypted http requests, or > are they automatically upgraded to https by apk? >=20 > The website for the kernel.org repos are https, like > https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/alpine/latest-stable/, but the URLs I see > in Alpine are just http. >=20 > Since we're talking about code running with all kinds of privileges, it > would be a huge problem if downloaded code wasn't coming in over a secure > connection. APK packages are secured with a signature-based chain of trust, and as long= as=20 that chain of trust is not compromised, it does not matter if the connectio= n=20 itself is secure or not. There is, incidentally, no knowledge of any compromise of our trust chain a= t=20 this time, and if there were, using HTTPS to deliver the packages would not= =20 change anything, as the compromised packages would still have valid=20 signatures. The primary concern of using a non-HTTPS channel is one of information=20 leakage; an attacker can learn based on observing your update traffic what= =20 packages are installed on a target system. If that is a concern to you, th= en=20 many mirrors are HTTPS-enabled, perhaps it makes sense to provide a list of= =20 HTTPS mirrors along side the HTTP mirror list. Ariadne